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Our Non-Originalist Right to Bear Arms
ROBERT LEIDER

*

District of Columbia v. Heller was a landmark, if controversial, opinion.
Discussion has centered on the merits of its self-described originalist approach.
Supporters praise its efforts to return to a more originalist and textualist approach
to constitutional questions, whereas critics challenge the accuracy of Heller’s
historical claims and criticize its departure from precedent.
This Article challenges much of the conventional wisdom about Heller, its use of
originalism, and its relationship to nineteenth- and twentieth-century case law.
This Article argues that, despite much of its rhetoric, Heller actually exemplified
popular constitutionalism—not originalism—in the way it approached the most
important practical question at issue in the case: determining the content of the
right to bear arms. On that question, Heller—and not United States v. Miller—is
largely consistent with the way, throughout most of American history, that both
state and federal courts have adjudicated cases involving the right to bear arms. In
particular, this Article argues that the dominant approach followed by
nineteenth-century courts was neither “originalist” nor “textualist” about the right
to bear arms. These courts did not look to how James Madison viewed the right in
1789 or how Americans in 1791 commonly understood the Second Amendment.
Instead, they attempted to find compromise positions on the scope of the right to
bear arms to accommodate a population divided between those believing in the
right and those seeking stronger restrictions on weapons. To do this, the
nineteenth-century courts shifted their understanding of the purpose of the right to
bear arms over time, which, in turn, enabled them to reach conclusions about the
content of the right that reflected the contemporaneous popular understanding of
the right—and of the right’s limits. In this revisionist account, Miller is the case
that represented a break with the courts’ historical approach because it arguably
allowed access to common military weapons—an approach that did not readily
allow courts to adjust the Second Amendment right to new circumstances as these
military weapons became increasingly destructive. These difficulties prompted
subsequent lower courts to adopt the “collective rights” interpretation of Miller—
an interpretation that was too rigidly restrictive, and therefore, also difficult to
adjust to reflect popular understandings. The Article concludes that Heller reflects
a new compromise: expanding the individual self-defense rationale while
diminishing the Second Amendment’s military objectives. This new compromise
recognizes an individual right to have self-defense weapons, while allowing greater
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control over military-style weapons—which aligns with how mainstream
Americans today view the right. Although Heller radically reshaped the Second
Amendment right to fit the twenty-first-century popular understanding of the right,
its methodological approach is quite consistent with how most courts have
approached Second Amendment questions—an approach that sounds more in
popular constitutionalism than originalism.
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INTRODUCTION
Two debates are raging on the Second Amendment. First, commentators have
dissected District of Columbia v. Heller1 from every direction to determine whether
it is “originalist” or not—and, if it is originalist, what kind. Original public
meaning? Subjective intent of the Framers? New originalism? Old originalism?
The second debate concerns what standard of review will (or should) apply to
Second Amendment claims following Heller, which only determined that the
review would not be rational basis.2
Like every debate on the Second Amendment, consensus on these questions
proves elusive. With respect to the first question, Mark Tushnet accepts the
characterization of Heller as “the most originalist opinion in recent Supreme Court
history.”3 Randy Barnett calls Justice Scalia’s majority opinion “the finest example
of what is now called ‘original public meaning’ jurisprudence ever adopted by the
Supreme Court.”4 Reva Siegel finds herself unable to concur in these assessments.

1. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
2. Id. at 628 n.27.
3. Mark Tushnet, Heller and the New Originalism, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 609, 609 (2008).
4. Randy E. Barnett, News Flash: The Constitution Means What It Says, WALL ST. J.,
June 27, 2008, at A13.
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For her, Heller is a product of twentieth-century social movements.5 Saul Cornell
states that Justice Scalia’s majority opinion pitted original public meaning
originalism against Justice Stevens’s approach to look toward the Framers’ intent.6
The critiques of Heller pour in from liberals7 and conservatives8 alike.
The second question is no less controversial. Commentators have called for, and
federal courts have applied, virtually every recognizable standard of review.9
Unlike federal courts, state courts have nearly 200 years of experience adjudicating
the right to bear arms. But analytical study into the state cases remains in its
nascent stages.10
Adam Winkler, in The Reasonable Right to Bear Arms, notes that state courts
distinguish between laws that purport to “regulate” the right to bear arms and those
laws that result in the total destruction of the right.11 With one exception,12 courts
have upheld laws that regulate the right but have struck down laws that prohibit
exercise of the right entirely. Identifying the “regulation/prohibition” distinction is
important when describing how courts have adjudicated claims under the Second
Amendment and state analogues. But the “regulation/prohibition” framework
leaves open a more basic question: What is the content of the right to keep and bear

5. Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Comment: Dead or Alive:
Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 192–93 (2008).
6. Saul Cornell, Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of
Columbia v. Heller, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 625, 625 (2008).
7. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Comment: Second
Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 246 (2008).
8. See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of
Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253 (2009); Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness, NEW
REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 32, 33 (classifying Heller as “faux originalism”).
9. See Lawrence Rosenthal, Second Amendment Plumbing After Heller: Of Standards
of Scrutiny, Incorporation, Well-Regulated Militias, and Criminal Street Gangs, 41 URB.
LAW. 1 (2009); Jason T. Anderson, Note, Second Amendment Standards of Review: What the
Supreme Court Left Unanswered in District of Columbia v. Heller, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 547
(2009). See generally Stacey L. Sobel, The Tsunami of Legal Uncertainty: What’s a Court
To Do Post-McDonald?, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 489 (2012) (collecting cases and
commentary); Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551 (2009).
10. See, e.g., CLAYTON E. CRAMER, FOR THE DEFENSE OF THEMSELVES AND THE STATE:
THE ORIGINAL INTENT AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR
ARMS (1994); Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional Law, 84 S.
CAL. L. REV. 323 (2011) (arguing, incorrectly in my view, that McDonald rejected the
near-unanimous reasonableness review of state courts for gun control laws under the Second
Amendment); Robert Dowlut & Janet A. Knoop, State Constitutions and the Right to Keep
and Bear Arms, 7 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 177 (1982); David B. Kopel, The Second
Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1359; David B. Kopel & Clayton
Cramer, State Court Standards of Review for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 50 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 1113 (2010) (surveying analytical approaches of state courts); Michael P.
O’Shea, Modeling the Second Amendment Right to Carry Arms (I): Judicial Tradition and
the Scope of “Bearing Arms” for Self-Defense, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 585 (2012).
11. Adam Winkler, The Reasonable Right to Bear Arms, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 597,
601–02 (2006) [hereinafter Winkler, Reasonable]; see also Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the
Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 717 (2007) [hereinafter Winkler, Scrutinizing].
12. See infra text accompanying notes 107–09.
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arms? Without the answer to this question, it is impossible to evaluate whether a
law is a mere “regulation” or a total “prohibition.”13
Analytically, a “right” can be divided into four components.14 There is the
subject of the right—that is, who holds the right.15 Second, the object of the right
consists of the persons or entities against whom the right is held. Third, we can ask,
“Why do we have the right?”—that is, what is the purpose of the right. Finally, we
have to define the content of the right. This Article is about how courts have shaped
the content of the right to bear arms around contemporaneous public opinion, and
how courts adjust their understanding of the purpose of the right when shaping and
reshaping the content. In so doing, this Article synthesizes the originalism/popular
constitutionalism debate with the nascent literature on state court review.
In analyzing Second Amendment questions about the content of the right, courts
usually have not asked what the Framers intended when they drafted the Second
Amendment, nor have they asked what Americans in 1791 understood the Second
Amendment to mean. Instead, courts define the content of the right to keep and
bear arms by looking to contemporaneous notions of reasonableness. The right,
then, gets applied against jurisdictions that have strayed too far from the

13. A number of contemporary cases ask not just if the right is “prohibited” entirely, but
whether the challenged regulation “frustrates” the purposes of the right. See, e.g., City of
Tucson v. Rineer, 971 P.2d 207, 214 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) (prohibition of firearm in a city
park “neither frustrates nor impairs” right to bear arms); Dano v. Collins, 802 P.2d 1021,
1022 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the ban on concealed weapons did not frustrate the
right to bear arms because individuals could carry their weapons openly); Benjamin v.
Bailey, 662 A.2d 1226, 1235 (Conn. 1995) (upholding Connecticut’s assault weapons ban
under “frustrates” standard); State v. Comeau, 448 N.W.2d 595 (Neb. 1989); State v.
Kessler, 614 P.2d 94, 99 (Or. 1980) (observing that courts generally ask whether “a
regulation is valid if the aim of public safety does not frustrate the guarantees of the state
constitution” and listing prohibitions on concealed weapons and bans on possession of
firearms by felons as examples of permissible regulations); State ex rel. City of Princeton v.
Buckner, 377 S.E.2d 139 (W. Va. 1988) (holding that a requirement to obtain a license to
carry a handgun, which was only issued after proving the applicant’s need to a judicial
officer who had discretion to issue or not issue the license, frustrated the exercise of the right
to bear a handgun for self-defense, and so was unconstitutional); State v. Hamdan, 2003 WI
113, 264 Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785 (invalidating prohibition of concealed weapons in a
person’s place of business on the grounds that the restriction would frustrate the right to bear
arms for self-defense); see also supra note 10 (collecting literature discussing the
“frustrates” framework). I treat the “frustrates” and “total prohibition” language as roughly
synonymous. The question is rarely whether the challenged regulation “prohibits” exercising
the right to keep and bear arms so thoroughly that people have no right to possess or carry
any type of arm. With the exception of felons and related classes, American laws have not
disarmed people entirely. Instead, the question courts generally ask is whether the law at
issue totally prohibits a core component of the right, such as the ability to possess protected
classes of arms or, in many jurisdictions, the ability to carry a firearm in public for
self-defense. My thanks to Michael O’Shea for alerting me to this issue and for collecting the
cases that use the “frustrates” test.
14. See DAVID RODIN, WAR AND SELF-DEFENSE 36 (2002).
15. In the case of the Second Amendment, the commentators generally debate whether
the right belongs to individuals generally, to only those individuals in a “well-regulated
militia,” or to state governments. See infra text accompanying note 344.
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then-commonly accepted scope of the right. In other words, if a jurisdiction
restricts the right to keep and bear arms beyond the contemporaneous popularly
accepted limit, courts will strike the law down as a “prohibition” of the right. In
contrast, laws within the popularly accepted mainstream are upheld as mere
“regulations”—even if the laws are prohibitory in character (e.g., a complete ban
on felons possessing guns16). Thus, when we ask how future courts will apply
Heller to novel Second Amendment claims, we should ask not what the Framers
understood the right to be, but how the contemporaneous population views the right
to bear arms.17
This Article begins by examining the development of this doctrine in the
nineteenth century. Since the nineteenth century, the population, legislature, and
courts have engaged in a dialectic on the content of the right to keep and bear arms
under the Second Amendment and state analogues.18 Restrictions on weapons are
almost always passed by legislatures in response to specific societal problems that
prompt concerted calls for legislation.19 Courts, then, get forced to mediate between
diverse social movements. In mediating these disputes, courts are very sensitive to
popular sentiments regarding the role of weapons in society.
While Heller employed originalism in determining the subjects of the Second
Amendment right, Heller is best understood as a continuation of this
nineteenth-century interpretive methodology when defining the content of the right
to bear arms. The nineteenth century witnessed two phases in Second Amendment
jurisprudence, one in the antebellum period and one following Reconstruction. In
each time period, the courts refashioned the right to keep and bear arms in a way
that respected the popular conception of the right as an individual right while
giving legislatures adequate authority to resolve contemporaneous social problems
involving weapons. Courts accomplish this by shifting their theory about the
purpose of the right to bear arms over time. When courts shift their theory about

16. See, e.g., People v. Swint, 572 N.W.2d 666, 671 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (felon-inpossession statute a “reasonable regulation” of the right to bear arms).
17. I say “novel” because courts (whether state or federal) have to contend with stare
decisis. As I argue below, courts will retheorize the purpose (and therefore the content) of
the right to bear arms when stare decisis becomes too much of an impediment to fashioning
the right around contemporary public meaning. Until that happens, however, a jurisdiction’s
jurisprudence on the right to bear arms is generally a mixture of the contemporary public
understanding of the right and holdover rules from earlier generations’ understanding of the
right. And even when the right gets refashioned, a few holdover rules remain, although often
in greatly altered form (for example, the post–Civil War rule in many states allowing
individuals to carry pistols openly in the hand for individual self-defense when the
contemporary jurisprudence largely had stopped recognizing a general right to carry
handguns for personal self-defense).
18. As I describe below, nineteenth-century courts viewed the Second Amendment and
state analogues as codifying the same preexisting right to bear arms. The former bound the
federal government, while the latter bound the states. Thus, state courts’ analyses did not
change significantly even if their constitutional provisions had slightly different wording
from the Second Amendment or from the right-to-bear-arms provisions in sister states.
19. I describe three examples below, including antebellum Southern concerns with
dueling, post–Civil War difficulties with handguns, and the use of submachine guns during
Prohibition.
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the purpose of the right to bear arms, they are able to adjust concomitantly the
content of the right to bear arms so that the content of the right reflects
contemporaneous notions of reasonableness. Heller, for example, changed the right
to be primarily about private self-defense in the home in order to justify
prohibitions on individuals having military arms that comport with today’s
understanding of a reasonable right to bear arms. Although Heller radically
reshaped the Second Amendment right to fit the twenty-first-century popular
understanding of the right, its popular constitutional project is deeply rooted in our
nation’s historical Second Amendment jurisprudence.20
This Article has four parts. In Part I, I describe how the antebellum state courts
resolved challenges to early state laws regulating weapons, especially initial
prohibitions against the carrying of concealed weapons. Although many state courts
gave a superficial history of the right to bear arms, the content of the right took on a
dimension that, like Heller, looked more populist than historical. Nearly every state
court recognized a right to bear arms for personal purposes under the Second
Amendment and state analogues. This even included states, such as Tennessee and
North Carolina, where the state constitution did not seem to protect a right to bear
arms for private purposes at all (e.g., the right only extended “for their common
defence”21 or “for defence of the state”22). The broad scope of the right to bear arms
was encapsulated in Chief Justice Taney’s comment, in Dred Scott, that free blacks
could not be citizens for, if they were, they would have a right “to keep and carry
arms wherever they went.”23
Although state courts approved a very broad right to bear arms for personal
purposes, they also came under significant pressure to recognize the power of the
legislature to regulate the right. Southern states were enacting laws against the
carrying of concealed weapons in order to stop dueling and other honor-related
killings. The Kentucky Court of Appeals, the first state court to hear a challenge to
a law alleged to violate the right to bear arms, took an absolutist approach, denying
any power of the legislature to regulate concealed weapons.24 The court saw no
difference between a “regulation” and a “prohibition” of the right to bear arms.25
The Kentucky court’s holding is a distinct outlier in American jurisprudence and
was quickly repudiated by every other state court to consider the scope of the right.
The foundation of the “regulation/prohibition” distinction came in this repudiation:
courts gave state legislatures power to regulate weapons provided they did not
abridge the right entirely, as defined by how the contemporaneous population then
understood the right. And the antebellum right, consistent with popular sentiment,
included the right to have arms in public for private self-defense. Courts permitted
states to prohibit concealed weapons, but made it clear that prohibitions on
unconcealed weapons would not be allowed. Some of these early cases began to

20. On the role of popular opinion in shaping the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, see
BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE
SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009).
21. TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. XI, § 26.
22. N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, § XVII.
23. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 417 (1857).
24. Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90 (1822).
25. Id. at 92.
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restrict the “arms” that were protected by the Second Amendment and state
analogues—generally excluding small weapons designed to be concealed—but a
few antebellum courts went further and protected only military-type weapons.
Courts sustained more pervasive regulation of select groups (e.g., prohibitions on
free blacks carrying arms) only under the theory that the regulated group did not
possess full constitutional rights.
In Part II, I explain how post–Civil War26 courts adopted a different theory of
the purpose of the right to bear arms in order to approve more severe regulations on
handguns. Contemporaneous legislatures, especially in Southern states, faced two
problems. First, while the Fourteenth Amendment made former slaves and free
blacks full citizens of the United States, the Southern white community did not
want black citizens to carry arms. Legislatures and courts could not rely on the
previous justification that all blacks, including those who were free, were
noncitizens beyond the full protection of the Bill of Rights. Second, the
prohibitions on concealed weapons proved inadequate to accomplish
contemporaneous crime-control objectives. There was widespread defiance of the
prohibition, and juries largely refused to convict white violators. The crime control
problem was exacerbated by the increasing deadliness of modern weapons,
especially concealable revolvers, which were ubiquitous following the Civil War.
While antebellum concealed weapon bans targeted Bowie knives, daggers, and
similar edged weapons, Reconstruction-era laws targeted handguns. This targeting
took several forms. First, virtually every new state and territory adopted laws on
concealed weapons; the only states that lacked concealed weapons laws were some
of the older Northern states. Second, many Southern states began to prohibit all
carrying of handguns, regardless of whether the weapon was concealed. Generally,
only travelers and peace officers were exempt. Third, a few jurisdictions—most
notably Tennessee—enacted near-total prohibitions on the sale of handguns.
Fourth, states began to restrict the places weapons could be carried, often banning
weapons in courts, bars, polling places, and public gatherings.
Courts responded to these legislative concerns by largely upholding these laws.
The power of states to prohibit concealed weapons became completely
entrenched—so much so that, by 1897, the U.S. Supreme Court considered
concealed weapons to be a historically understood exception to the right to bear
arms rather than a regulation of it.27 But state courts also redefined the right to keep
and bear arms in order to uphold near-total prohibitions against the carrying of
pistols. Instead of emphasizing the right to bear arms for private purposes, state
courts viewed the right primarily in a “civic republican” lens.28 They held that the
right to bear arms primarily existed for defense of the community, not for private
self-defense. Accordingly, the weapons that were protected were individual
military weapons (i.e., “ordinary military equipment”), not weapons primarily

26. I am looking primarily in the time period of 1870–1900.
27. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 282 (1897).
28. On civic republicanism and the Second Amendment, see, for example, Glenn Harlan
Reynolds, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms Under the Tennessee Constitution: A Case
Study in Civic Republican Thought, 61 TENN. L. REV. 647 (1994); David C. Williams, Civic
Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 YALE L.J.
551 (1991).
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carried for personal self-defense. Under this view, military rifles and carbines
received the most constitutional protection, whereas handguns received almost
none.
In Part III, I articulate a revisionist account of why the lower federal courts
adopted the collective rights view of the Second Amendment after United States v.
Miller.29 My argument is that the lower federal courts’ adoption of the collective
rights view was a failure of courts to refashion the right to keep and bear arms in
view of changing conceptions of the right. The “collective rights view” of the
Second Amendment—the idea that the right to keep and bear arms is contingent on
service in an organized state militia—was first adopted by the Kansas Supreme
Court in 1905.30 But it became the predominant view in the federal courts from
1935 until Heller.
Although the Supreme Court had considered Second Amendment claims several
times before Miller, the Court always found ways to dispose of those claims on
narrow grounds and thereby avoid any broad pronouncement on the scope of the
Second Amendment.31 Miller squarely raised the question of the Second
Amendment’s scope: relying on the 1905 Kansas Supreme Court case, the
government’s primary argument was that the Second Amendment only protected a
collective right.32 At issue was the constitutionality of the National Firearms Act,
which regulated “gangster”-style weapons, including machine guns and sawed-off
shotguns.33 Miller had been indicted for transporting a sawed-off shotgun. Despite
the fact that the government squarely raised the question in Miller, the Supreme
Court assiduously refused—again—to make any broad pronouncements concerning
the scope of the Second Amendment. Instead, the Court, following most
nineteenth-century courts, held that only ordinary military weapons were protected.
While Miller cleanly disposed of a sawed-off shotgun case, it placed the lower
federal courts in a difficult position. The military was transitioning toward
automatic weapons, which were widely considered inappropriate for civilian use.
But Miller seemed to entrench the nineteenth-century case law holding that “arms”
included only “ordinary military equipment.”34 This left lower courts unable to
adapt the Second Amendment to prevailing popular opinion regarding the scope of
the right. Weapons considered appropriate for civilian possession, such as hunting
rifles and handguns for individual self-defense, did not seemingly come within

29. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
30. See City of Salina v. Blaksley, 83 P. 619 (Kan. 1905); Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun
Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 244
(1983). I note below that at least one of the opinions in State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1842),
may have held this view of the Second Amendment in the antebellum period, see infra text
accompanying notes 190–95, but it was not a view that gained the acceptance of any court
until Blaksley.
31. For example, in Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886), the Court held that the right
to keep and bear arms was not infringed by a law that prohibited citizens (other than on-duty
militia) from parading as an armed group in public.
32. Brief for the United States at 15, Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) (No. 696).
33. National Firearms Act, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934) (codified as amended at 26
U.S.C. §§ 5801–72 (2012)).
34. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
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Miller’s scope of “ordinary military equipment.” Conversely, military-style
weapons, now considered inappropriate for civilian possession, received the highest
constitutional protection. Unwilling to accept this, lower federal courts widely
adopted the “collective rights view” of the Second Amendment.35 Because the
practical effect of the collective rights view is that no one can ever raise a
successful Second Amendment challenge, adopting the collective rights view
allowed the lower federal courts to withdraw from adjudicating Second
Amendment claims and thereby removed them from the Miller conundrum.
Heller marked a revival of the nineteenth-century project of protecting the right
of the people to keep and bear arms while recognizing the power of the legislature
to deal with contemporaneous social problems. The only ostensibly originalist
portion of Heller was when the Court correctly held that the Second Amendment
right was not exercisable solely by active-duty militiamen in the performance of
their official duties.36 Heller’s originalism ended with defining the proper subjects
of the right. Fleshing out the content of the right was a triumph of popular
constitutionalism. The Court protected Heller’s handgun because “handguns are
[currently] the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in the
home”—not because the Framers viewed handguns as constitutionally protected
weapons.37 In contrast, the Court, in dicta, approved the constitutionality of
complete prohibitions on weapons like the M16 rifle (which is the quintessential
personal weapon of today’s militiamen) on an ahistorical reading of the
common-law prohibition against carrying (not possessing) “dangerous and unusual
weapons.”38 Moreover, the Court’s list of presumptively lawful regulatory
measures, such as the “longstanding” prohibition on all felons from having guns
(a prohibition that was so “longstanding” that Justice Alito, the Heller Court’s
youngest member, was eighteen years old when it was passed), reads more like
today’s understanding of the right to bear arms than it does the Framers’.39 But in
codifying the contemporaneous popular understanding of the right to bear arms, the
Supreme Court has simply continued a conversation that began in the early
eighteen hundreds.
I. ANTEBELLUM PERIOD
Fashioning the right to keep and bear arms around the popular conception of the
right began with the earliest court decisions on the right to keep and bear arms
under the Second Amendment and state analogues. Although these decisions
predate modern incorporation of the Bill of Rights, some state courts still applied
the Second Amendment to state laws.40 Others treated the Second Amendment and
state analogues as generally coextensive because the federal and state constitutional
provisions codified the same preexisting right to bear arms.41 The only difference

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

See infra Part III.C.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 584 (2008).
Id. at 629.
See id. at 627.
Id. at 626–27.
See, e.g., Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 250 (1846).
See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1876) (“[The right to bear
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between federal and state constitutional guarantees was that the former bound the
federal government whereas the latter bound state governments.
These decisions are remarkable for several reasons. Very few of the cases
engaged in any sort of “originalist” analysis: no one asked what James Madison
thought in drafting the provision or looked to the ratifying conventions. Most cases
focused on the English Bill of Rights—sometimes exclusively—as supplying the
purpose for the right to bear arms, which was to resist political oppression.42 The
American right to bear arms was then treated as a broader version of the English
privilege since, unlike the English version, the Second Amendment neither limited
arms according to a person’s social status nor did it contain the restriction “as
allowed by law.”43
Despite this political purpose, most antebellum state courts additionally
recognized a very broad right to carry arms for private self-defense. Although these
courts largely sustained prohibitions on concealed weapons as a permissible
regulation of the right to bear arms, they also made clear that the right to carry
weapons openly for private self-defense could not be infringed. This was true even
when state courts construed state constitutional provisions that seemed to offer no
protection for private self-defense. In an era when many men carried weapons,
lawfully or not, the courts interpreted differently worded state constitutional rights
to arms so they converged around popular beliefs about the scope of the right.
Finally, despite recognizing a very broad right to keep and bear arms, these
courts took seriously the legislature’s efforts at controlling crime with dangerous
weapons. There was substantial popular outcry against the public carrying of
weapons. Upholding the prohibitions on concealed weapons while striking down
prohibitions on openly carried weapons was an attempt to mediate between a
population torn between recognizing the right to carry weapons for private
purposes while demanding legislative solutions to dueling and other honor-related
killings.
A. Antebellum State Laws
Antebellum state laws governing dangerous weapons generally fell into six
categories. These laws (1) increased penalties for using weapons in crimes,
especially when dueling; (2) regulated the discharge of firearms; (3) regulated arms
for those enrolled in the militia; (4) prohibited prisoners from possessing weapons;
(5) prohibited individuals from carrying concealed weapons; and (6) prohibited
slaves, free blacks, and Indians from possessing or receiving weapons without a
license. The first four of these categories did not seem to raise any constitutional
arms for a lawful purpose] is not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any
manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence. The second amendment declares
that it shall not be infringed . . . .”); State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 26–27 (1842) (opinion of
Ringo, C.J.); Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 157 (1840) (holding that the Second
Amendment and Tennessee rights to bear arms have the same purpose).
42. See, e.g., State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 615 (1840); Aymette, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) at 156–
57 (giving the English history but giving virtually no American history on the adoption of
the Second Amendment).
43. Aymette, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) at 156–58; see also 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1891, at 747 (1833).
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concerns about violating the right to keep and bear arms. The main antebellum
judicial battles were fought over concealed weapons bans and, to a lesser degree,
laws against slaves and free blacks having arms.
1. Antebellum Laws Triggering No Significant Judicial Scrutiny
Four types of weapons regulations did not seem to raise any significant scrutiny
under the Second Amendment or state analogues. I will quickly note these in
passing before moving to the concealed weapons laws, which received
considerably more judicial scrutiny.
First, states passed laws increasing penalties for crimes when weapons were
involved. Most commonly, states enacted comprehensive statutes designed to
prohibit dueling.44 These laws often declared a killing during a duel to be murder—
not manslaughter—and subjected duelers to various disabilities such as prohibiting
them from holding office.45 Some of these laws remain on the books.46 Other early
laws also increased the penalties for non-dueling offenses (e.g., robbery) when
armed.47 Targeting the possession or use of weapons in conjunction with criminal
offenses generally was not thought to raise any sort of Second Amendment issue.48

44. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 7, 1810, 1809–1811 Ill. Laws 25(adopting the Virginia antidueling code); Act of Dec. 18, 1813, 1813 Ind. Laws 2d Sess. 442; Act of May 4, 1805, ch.
50, § 25, 1804 La. Acts 1st Sess. 416, 434; Act of Mar. 18, 1796, ch. 600, § 56, 1795 N.J.
Laws 2d Sitting 92, 107; Act of Nov. 5, 1816, ch. 1, 1816 N.Y. Laws 3; Act of Apr. 22,
1794, ch. 238, § 10, 1793 Pa. Laws 546, 551; Act of Jan. 26, 1810, ch. 10, 1809 Va. Acts 9;
see also infra note 45.
45. Act of Oct. 23, 1820, § 1, 1818–1820 Ark. Acts. 110, 110 (dueling causing death
within three months declared murder); Offenses Against the Public Peace and Tranquility,
§ 7, 1816 Ga. Laws 178, 180 (removing from office any justice or other officer having
knowledge of a duel and failing to arrest the participants); Act of Mar. 15, 1805, ch. 77, § 6,
1805 Mass. Acts. Jan. Sess. 643, 644–645 (prohibiting duelers from holding office for
twenty years); Act of Jan. 30, 1802, 1801 Miss. Laws July & Oct. Extra. Sess. 156, 170; Act
of Feb. 20, 1809, ch. 124, § 25, 8 Ohio Laws 534, 542–43 (lifetime ban on holding office or
being a juror, and dueler to be stripped half naked and placed on view); Act of Jan. 15, 1805,
ch. 1, 1804 Ohio Acts 1, 10 (“forever disfranchised”). Some of the comprehensive dueling
codes cited supra note 44 also contain prohibitions on holding office.
46. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-13-104(2) (West 2013) (making dueling a
class 4 felony); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-303 (2004) (giving jurisdiction if person dies in state
from a duel out of state); KY. CONST. §§ 228, 239 (requiring officers and attorneys to swear
that they have not participated in a duel and prohibiting those who have dueled from taking
office); MICH. COMP. LAW ANN. § 750.319 (West 2004) (classifying dueling as first-degree
murder); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-39-3 (West 2011) (disenfranchising duelers and prohibiting
them from holding office).
47. See, e.g., An Act for Regulating New-Gate Prison, in Granby, and for Regulating
and Governing the Same: And for the Punishment of Certain Attrocious Crimes and
Felonies, 1790 Conn. Acts 392, 393 (May Sess.) (aggravated robbery); Act of Dec. 22, 1802,
ch. 53, § 15, 1802 Ky. Acts 107, 115 (armed robbery); Act of Oct. 1, 1804, ch. 1, § 6, 1804
La. Acts Ind. Territory 3, 6. (burglary while armed); Act of Mar. 15, 1805 § 5, 1805 Mass.
Acts. Jan. Sess. at 284 (assault while armed); Act of Feb. 28, 1799, 1799 Miss. Laws 41, 46
(aggravating penalty for burglary).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Sheldon, 5 Blume Sup. Ct. Trans. 337, 346, 1829 WL
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Second, states regulated the discharge of firearms within city limits and the
storage of gunpowder to prevent fires.49 Many of these statutes continued a practice
of regulating firearm discharges that existed even in colonial times.50 I have found
no early court cases alleging any constitutional infirmities in these statutes,
although modern incarnations of these statutes seem to be more controversial
today.51
Third, both the federal government and the states passed militia regulations.
These laws required able-bodied white male citizens between certain ages, often
eighteen to forty-five, to own muskets and to report for militia duty.52 Interestingly,
I have not found early court cases or newspaper articles alleging that laws
regulating weapons held by citizens qua militiamen violated the Second
Amendment. No one seemed to recognize any libertarian right of militiamen to
bring personal weapons into military service according to the militiamen’s
individual discretion. The lack of any concern that militia regulations could impair
the right to bear arms is important: proponents of the collective rights view have
the burden to articulate what the right to bear arms is, as opposed to a militiaman’s
duty to bear arms. Imposing fairly detailed affirmative obligations on the type of
weapons with which citizens must report to militia duty seemed to trigger no
constitutional concern whatever.53

3021 (Mich. 1829) (“[T]he grant of this privilege cannot be construed into the right in him
who keeps a gun to destroy his neighbor. No rights are intended to be granted by the
constitution for an unlawful or unjustifiable purpose.”). I found one case where the contrary
was argued. In Cockrum v. State, 24 Tex. 394, 401–03 (1859), the Supreme Court of Texas
held that a Texas law, which punished manslaughter as murder when committed with a
Bowie knife, was not a prohibition on the right to bear arms. Instead, the law regulated an
abuse of that right. Only if penalties deterred the lawful exercise of the right completely
would there be a constitutional difficulty.
49. See Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, A Well Regulated Right: The Early American
Origins of Gun Control, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 487, 510–12, 515–16 (2004).
50. Id. at 502.
51. See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011) (striking down a ban on
shooting ranges inside city limits).
52. See Cornell & DeDino, supra note 49, at 508–10; Winkler, Scrutinizing, supra note
11, at 709 n.148 (collecting examples of these laws).
53. That mandatory gun ownership triggered no constitutional concerns is important. A
recent article by Joseph Blocher argues that the Second Amendment, as understood by
Heller, grants a right not to bear arms. See Joseph Blocher, The Right Not to Keep or Bear
Arms, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2012). Blocher asserts that Heller redefined the Second
Amendment to be about personal safety, unmooring it from its militia-related objective.
Given that personal safety is sometimes enhanced by not having weapons present, the
Second Amendment should be read to imply a negative right, just like the First Amendment
recognizes a right not to speak. But as Blocher himself notes, this reading of the Second
Amendment is completely ahistorical. See id. at 40–41 (trying to reconcile his view with the
Militia Act of 1792). Blocher errs when he argues that the personal safety rationale of the
Second Amendment supplants—rather than supplements—the militia objective. As I will
describe below, antebellum state courts generally recognized a broad right to carry
militia-type weapons for personal self-defense. Having weapons available for personal
purposes did not alter the duty to bear arms when called for militia service. The government
has always had the power to force people to bear arms.
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Fourth, laws were enacted against transferring weapons to prisoners to prevent
escapes.54 While Heller in dicta approved “longstanding” laws prohibiting felons
and the mentally ill from possessing firearms,55 laws prohibiting prisoners from
receiving weapons were the only “status” bans applied against citizens that I have
discovered.56 Some of these laws went further by more broadly prohibiting
conveying weapons into the jails to allow an escape, whether transferred to the
prisoner or not. Like the discharge statutes, I have found no court cases that raise
any constitutional question about banning prisoners from having weapons or
bringing weapons into the jails. In 1842, the Arkansas Supreme Court in State v.
Buzzard said that the practice had long gone unquestioned.57 State courts did not
adjudicate cases involving total prohibitions on the right to bear arms in narrowly
defined areas (e.g., polling places, bars, and courthouses) until after the Civil
War.58 Nor have I found any contemporaneous newspaper accounts suggesting that
laws restricting weapons to prisoners implicate the right to bear arms.
Thus, although the antebellum right to bear arms included possessing arms for
personal purposes, there seem to be several categories of weapons regulations that
received virtually no scrutiny. Given the lack of discussion, it seems that these laws
were not understood to raise any serious constitutional questions.
2. Antebellum Laws Triggering State Court Review
Two sets of laws did trigger state court review under the Second Amendment
and state analogues. These were, first, prohibitions on carrying weapons in public
and, second, laws that required licenses for free blacks and slaves.
In 1813, states began regulating the public carrying of weapons.59 Kentucky
passed the first prohibition of concealed weapons in 1813, and Louisiana followed
later that year. These laws spread throughout the South and West, with Indiana,

54. Act of Feb. 25, 1824, ch. 282, § 11, 1824 Me. Laws 1000, 1006 (prohibiting
conveying weapon to a prisoner or possessing weapon in a prison with a purpose to facilitate
an escape); Act of June 21, 1811, ch. 32, § 8, 1811 Mass. Acts. May Sess. 418, 422
(prohibiting conveying a weapon to a prisoner with the intent of facilitating escape); Act of
June 19, 1812, § 8, 1812 N.H. Laws June Sess. 18, 21–22 (prohibiting conveying a weapon
to a prisoner or possessing a weapon in a prison with a purpose to facilitate an escape); Act
of Nov. 9, 1808, ch. 78, § 9, 1808 Vt. Acts & Laws 107, 112.
55. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008).
56. See State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 21 (1842) (opinion of Ringo, C.J.) (“Persons
accused of crime, upon their arrest, have constantly been divested of their arms, without the
legality of the act having ever been questioned.”); C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha
Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 695 (2009).
57. Buzzard, 4 Ark. at 21.
58. See infra note 277 and accompanying text.
59. Tennessee, which was at the forefront of gun control throughout the eighteen
hundreds, did have an 1801 statute authorizing justices of the peace to require sureties of any
person who (1) violated the common-law prohibition against going armed to the terror of the
people or (2) privately carried any “dirk, large knife, pistol, or any other dangerous weapon”
privately to the terror of the people. Act of Nov. 13, 1801, ch. 22, § 6, 1801 Tenn. Pub. Acts
259, 260–61.
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Tennessee, Arkansas, Georgia, Virginia, Alabama, Florida, and Ohio adopting
similar laws.60
Early concealed weapons prohibitions had a fair degree of uniformity. They
generally enumerated several weapons that were of particular concern, including
dirks or daggers, Bowie knives, swords concealed in canes, and pistols or some
subset of pistols (e.g., “pocket pistols”).61 Many of these laws, therefore, did not
explicitly regulate muskets, rifles, or shotguns, though most states enacted catchall
provisions at the end of the enumerated list that applied to other dangerous or
deadly weapons.62 The first three concealed weapons statutes, in Kentucky,
Louisiana, and Indiana, were punishable by a stiff fine,63 but later statutes, while
keeping the fines, also added short jail terms—typically no more than three or six
months.64 Only one state—Georgia—went further and prohibited openly carried
weapons as well, a fact that would be constitutionally significant when the statute
was challenged.65 In addition to the ban on carrying concealed weapons, Georgia
and Tennessee passed laws that prohibited the sale of Bowie knives and most
pistols, respectively.66
The original concealed weapons laws had few exceptions. Some of the early
statutes did not apply to travelers,67 and this exception still exists in a number of
states.68 Most statutes contained no privilege for law enforcement officers.69

60. Act of Feb. 1, 1839, No. 77, 1838 Ala. Acts 67; ARK. REV. STAT. div. VIII, ch. 44
(1838); Act of Jan. 28, 1835, ch. 860, 1835 Fla. Laws 318; Act of Dec. 25, 1837, 1837 Ga.
Laws 90; Act of Jan. 14, 1820, ch. 23, 1819 Ind. Laws 39; Act of Feb. 3, 1813, ch. 89, 1812
Ky. Acts 101; Act of Mar. 25, 1813, 1813 La. Acts 172; Act of Mar. 18, 1859, 1859 Ohio
Laws 56; Act of Oct. 19, 1821, ch. 13, 1821 Tenn. Pub. Acts 15; Act of Feb. 2, 1838, ch.
101, 1838 Va. Acts 76.
61. See the Kentucky, Louisiana, Indiana, Alabama, Georgia, Virginia, Ohio, and
Arkansas laws cited supra note 60; see also Act of Jan. 27, 1838, ch. 137, 1837–1838 Tenn.
Pub. Acts 200 (fighting knives only).
62. Louisiana’s law included “deadly weapons,” Indiana’s “unlawful weapons,”
Florida’s “all arms,” Alabama’s fighting knives and firearms, Virginia’s weapons “of like
kind” to pistols and fighting knives, and Ohio’s encompassed all dangerous weapons.
63. Kentucky’s law had a minimum $100 fine. Louisiana’s law allowed fines of $20–
$50. And Indiana’s law allowed a fine of up to $100.
64. For example, Florida ($50–$500, one to six months’ imprisonment); Virginia ($50–
$500, one to six months’ imprisonment); Tennessee ($200–$500, three to six months’
imprisonment); Ohio ($200 or thirty days on first offense; second offense, up to $500 or
three months in jail or both). See laws cited supra note 60.
65. Act of Dec. 25, 1837, 1837 Ga. Laws 90; see also Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846).
66. Act of Dec. 25, 1837 § 1, 1837 Ga. Laws at 90; Act of Jan. 27, 1838 § 1, 1837–1838
Tenn. Pub. Acts at 200–01.
67. Specifically, Kentucky’s statute, Tennessee’s 1821 statute (but not its 1838 Bowie
knife statute), and Indiana’s statute did not apply to travelers. Neither did Alabama’s 1841
version of the statute. See Of Miscellaneous Offenses, ch. 7, § 4, 1840 Ala. Acts 148, 148–
49.
68. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-120(c)(4) (2005); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 18-12-105(2)(b) (2013); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-37-9(b) (West 2011); TEXAS PENAL CODE
§ 46.15(b)(2) (West 2011).
69. Alabama’s, Kentucky’s, Indiana’s, Louisiana’s, Tennessee’s, and Virginia’s statutes
had no law enforcement exception, for example.
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Indeed, the first challenge to a concealed weapon ban in Alabama involved a local
sheriff who was prosecuted for carrying his pistol concealed.70 A few statutes,
however, did exempt peace officers, but only while in the performance of their
official duties.71 None of the statutes privileged militiamen, even in the
performance of their duties.72 An Alabama concealed weapon ban and an Ohio
statute allowed juries to acquit if they thought the person had reasonable cause to
fear an attack.73
Laws that regulated free blacks and slaves having guns constituted a second
category of laws that antebellum state courts scrutinized to see if they were
compatible with the right to bear arms. These laws generally made it illegal for free
blacks or slaves to have guns without a license. Licenses were issued for limited
times either from the slave’s owner or the justice of the peace.74 The prohibitions
generally extended both to public carrying and to possession in the home. The laws
did not contain extensive guidance on issuing licenses, except to state the term of
the license and the person authorized to issue it.
B. Antebellum Courts and the “Regulation/Prohibition” Distinction:
Fashioning a Broad Right for Private Self-Defense While Allowing States to
Regulate Concealed Weapons
The antebellum right to bear arms was fought primarily over the early concealed
weapons statutes. Much like today’s courts, antebellum state courts found
themselves caught between a divided population. On the one hand, the carrying of
guns and knives was ubiquitous throughout the South and West. Many within the
population thought that they had a right to carry weapons for personal protection.
On the other hand, the public clamored for legislative solutions to high crime rates.
The presence of guns and knives was widely thought to make ordinary arguments
more deadly, as the conflicted parties resorted to weapons to solve their disputes.75

70. State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612 (1840).
71. Georgia’s statute had an early exemption. Act of Dec. 25, 1837 § 4, 1837 Ga. Laws at
90. Law enforcement officers have been granted increasing power to carry concealed weapons
over time, as exemptions gradually expanded to allow the carrying of weapons off-duty in the
officer’s state or jurisdiction. Current federal law allows most current and retired law
enforcement officers to carry concealed pistols throughout the country. 18 U.S.C. §§ 926B,
926C (2012).
72. Maryland had a proposal to ban all carrying of weapons, excepting militiamen. See
MISS. FREE TRADER & NATCHEZ GAZETTE, Feb. 17, 1837 (citing NAT’L INTELLIGENCER).
73. Of Miscellaneous Offenses § 4, 1840 Ala. Acts at 148–49; Act of Mar. 18, 1859, 1859
Ohio Laws 56.
74. Act of Feb. 7, 1827, ch. 50, § 8, 1827 Del. Laws 120, 125–26; Act of Jan. 4, 1807, ch.
81, § 2, 1806 Md. Laws (requiring annual license issued on certificate of good conduct); Act of
June 18, 1822, § 10, 1822 Miss. Laws 5th Sess. Adjourned 179, 181–82; Act of Mar. 30, 1799,
1799 Miss. Laws 112 (requiring a license for both slaves and free blacks); Act of Jan. 11, 1841,
ch. 30, 1840–1841 N.C. Laws 61; Act of May 10, 1740, No. 695, § 23, 1731–1743 S.C. Pub.
Laws 163, 168–69; cf. Act of Dec. 20, 1800, 1800 S.C. Acts 44, 46 (generally prohibiting
nonwhites from carrying a weapon when in militia service, but providing some exceptions).
75. See, e.g., FREDERICK LAW OLMSTED, A JOURNEY IN THE BACK COUNTRY 414–15
(1860).
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My argument in this Subpart is that the courts’ approval of the concealed
weapon statutes was a compromise solution that incorporated the popular
conception of the right to bear arms as well as the public’s demand for legislative
solutions to stop people from carrying weapons. Antebellum courts mostly did not
look to originalism or the Framing era to supply the scope of the right to bear arms.
As Heller correctly recognized, personal self-defense did not lead to the right’s
codification.76 Instead, after giving some discussion of the English Bill of Rights,
antebellum state courts found a broad right to possess and carry arms for private
self-defense, both inside and outside the home.
1. The Popular Dimensions of the Antebellum Gun Control Struggle
Much like today, the antebellum judiciary faced a divided populace on the role
of weapons in society. There is a contemporary perception that the promiscuous
carrying of weapons was socially acceptable in the eighteen hundreds in a way that
it is not today; in actuality, nineteenth-century America struggled with the practice.
In 1837, a grand jury in Baltimore said that “[t]he wearing of deadly weapons . . . is
an intolerable nuisance, unnecessary in the present state of any civilized
community, dangerous in its tendencies, prenicious [sic] in its consequences and
destructive alike of good morals and the public peace.”77 A grand jury in
Philadelphia reached a similar conclusion that same year. It “denounce[d] the habit
of carrying deadly weapons as a dastardly and brutal practice” and issued a
recommendation that the Pennsylvania General Assembly prohibit the practice.78
The grand juries’ positions are easy to understand. Nineteenth-century
newspapers were filled with stories about slight personal offenses escalating into
deadly conflicts. The National Intelligencer and Baltimore American reported that
a “resort [to deadly weapons] in individual affrays appears to be now a matter of
almost daily occurrence, especially in the West and Southwest.”79 The newspaper
then reported two examples.
In the first, Robert Binford, a candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives in
Kentucky, went to the house of Judge James, a state senator. Binford accused
James of saying something negative about Binford’s recent election, which James
denied. But James was unarmed and rushed back into his house. Binford followed
with his pistol, but he was unable to get into the house and a bystander convinced
Binford to go home. Two days later, the two met at a local tavern. When James
asked if Binford was there to assassinate him, Binford responded, “What I came
for, I came for.”80 Both drew pistols and fired. James killed Binford, which a court
ruled was justifiable. Binford’s shot hit an innocent bystander in the head, killing
him.

76. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008).
77. Wearing Deadly Weapons, DAILY COM. BULL. & MO. LITERARY REG. (St. Louis),
Apr. 10, 1837.
78. DAILY HERALD & GAZETTE (Cleveland), May 2, 1837.
79. DAILY NAT’L INTELLIGENCER (Washington, D.C.), Nov. 29, 1837 (citing the BALT.
AM.).
80. Id. (citing the LOUISVILLE ADVERTISER, Nov. 22, 1837).
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The newspaper account of the second killing lacks the dramatic details of the
first. It appears that a man in Mississippi got into a fight with some members of
another family, one of whom shot and stabbed him. There was no indication of
whether this attack was ruled murder or justifiable homicide, though from the
sparse details given, it seems hard to imagine it was the latter.81
One can find many other accounts of the indiscriminate use of weapons,
especially in the South. The University of Virginia, for example, had a “small
rebellion” in September of 1836.82 The student military company and the faculty
were locked in a battle over whether the military company had to request faculty
permission to drill with muskets on campus. At the end of October, after the
military company made an application for permission, the university imposed its
customary three conditions: the members had to wear the university uniform,
muskets could not be discharged on the University Lawn, and muskets were only to
be carried when performing military exercises.83 The military company refused to
accept these conditions, claiming that it was a state military company independent
of the university and with authority to drill.84
With the military company’s right to drill unsettled, the faculty demanded that
the company return its weapons to the armory.85 In response, the military company
refused to disband and indicated that it would continue drilling until the faculty
relented. The company backed its refusal with two hours of shooting on the
University Lawn, which only escalated the situation. The faculty searched the
dormitories for weapons and those involved in the shooting incident. The company,
in turn, responded with a full-scale riot, which caused the professors to arm
themselves in self-defense. Eventually, the sheriff, backed with a military unit,
restored order to the university, and a grand jury was summoned.86
The riot was celebrated annually at the University of Virginia, but in 1840, the
celebration had tragic results. Professor Davis, who objected to celebrating the
anniversary, attempted to break up the demonstration. While attempting to remove
the mask of a celebrating student, the student shot and killed the professor.87 This
senseless death caused the South Carolina Temperance Advocate, a Columbia,
South Carolina-based newspaper, to implore nearby students to stop carrying
weapons—which suggests that the paper thought that local students were
frequently armed.88
The Pennsylvania Inquirer and National Gazette also thought that southern
students were armed. The newspaper stated, “It is charged against some of the
medical students of the South, that a few years ago, the wearing of concealed

81. Id. (citing the LOUISVILLE J., Nov. 23, 1837).
82. 2 PHILIP ALEXANDER BRUCE, HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, 1819–1919,
at 302 (1920).
83. Id. at 303.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 303–04.
86. Id. at 304–06.
87. Id. at 309–10; see also Beware of Carrying Deadly Weapons, 2 S.C. TEMPERANCE
ADVOC. 90, 90 (1840).
88. Beware of Carrying Deadly Weapons, supra note 87, at 90.
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weapons was by no means rare among them.”89 The paper then noted that even
members of Congress carried weapons at the Capitol.
When contemporaneous newspapers railed against individuals carrying
weapons, they mostly railed against the entire practice of publicly going armed
with pistols and knives. The ire was not directed solely against weapons carried in a
concealed manner. The National Intelligencer, for example, described the
“murderous practice” as the carrying of a weapon, not the carrying of the weapon
concealed.90 A Cleveland paper, five years later, agreed with that assessment.91
Likewise, the Baltimore and Philadelphia grand juries also complained about the
wearing of deadly weapons, rather than merely their concealment.
When concealed weapons were singled out—which they often were—news
articles assumed that individuals would not go armed with unconcealed weapons.
In other words, if people stopped carrying concealed weapons, they would not be
armed at all. Thus, in 1842, the Pennsylvania Inquirer and National Gazette
lamented that an assault and battery had turned fatal due to the presence of a
concealed weapon. But the article made clear that the problem was the accessibility
of the deadly weapon, not the fact of concealment: “Had [the perpetrator] been
without a deadly weapon, his offence, it is probable, would have amounted to
nothing more than a mere assault and battery.”92 The article then criticized the
“young men from the South and West—who carry deadly weapons” because, the
paper argued, “a man who mingles in society with deadly weapons about him [may
have murder in his heart].”93 An 1837 Missouri newspaper article likewise equated
“this fatal habit of carrying weapon[s] clandestinely” with having a weapon “ready
at hand.”94
The fact that contemporaneous sentiment within many quarters opposed all
public carrying of weapons is important in trying to determine the purpose of
concealed weapons laws at that time. Two rationales have been offered—both of
which have some basis in the sentiments of the time. Under one view, the purpose
of the concealed weapons ban was an attempt to stop individuals from carrying
handguns and knives entirely. The Louisiana Supreme Court commented in a late
nineteenth-century case that “[t]he manifest object of the statute was to prevent the
carrying of dangerous weapons—to stamp out a practice that has been and is
fruitful of bloodshed, misery, and death—and yet so to prohibit the carrying as not
to infringe the constitutional right to keep and bear arms.”95 Although this decision
dated from 1885, as the newspaper accounts above indicate, this was also an
accurate description of the predominant antebellum sentiment.

89. Concealed Weapons: The Cases of Colt and Alexander., PA. INQUIRER & NAT’L
GAZETTE (Phila.), Dec. 21, 1842.
90. DAILY NAT’L INTELLIGENCER, supra note 79.
91. Carrying Deadly Weapons, CLEVELAND DAILY HERALD, Aug. 14, 1843.
92. Concealed Weapons: The Cases of Colt and Alexander, supra note 89.
93. Id.
94. DAILY NAT’L INTELLIGENCER (D.C.), Aug. 7, 1837 (quoting the ST. LOUIS BULL.).
95. State v. Bias, 37 La. Ann. 259, 260 (1885). Perhaps, though, this reflected the views
of Louisiana in 1885 more than the antebellum period. The Louisiana Supreme Court
adopted the second theory in State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489 (1850).
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The second theory was that concealing a weapon especially threatened public
safety because one party could take the other by surprise. A lot of court cases cited
this rationale, including some contemporaneous cases.96 The newspaper story
describing the University of Virginia shooting both decried the practice of going
armed generally and the practice of using a hidden weapon upon “an unsuspecting
opponent, who is ignorant that he is contending with an armed man.”97 But the
predominant grievance seems to be against the carrying of an accessible weapon,
rather than the concealing of it.
While the public’s precise view on the right to bear arms is difficult to gauge, it
seems fairly clear that many thought the right encompassed the public carrying of
weapons apart from militia service. Every state law enacted before 1840 (except
Virginia’s) that prohibited concealed weapons was attacked as unconstitutional in
state courts before the Civil War.98 The only exception, Virginia, had no state
analogue of the Second Amendment to apply until 1971.99 Defiance of the
concealed weapons laws, often on constitutional grounds, was widespread. The
Kentucky governor—agreeing with the state’s highest court100 that the Kentucky
concealed weapons statute was unconstitutional—quite openly defied the law by
taking concealed pistols to church; the butt of one gun stuck out of his pants pocket
during the service.101 Alabama’s constitutional challenge involved a local sheriff,
who apparently thought he had a right to carry a concealed pistol.102 The
then-Republic of Texas legislature delayed adopting its concealed weapons statute
until legislators were satisfied that the act would not violate the right to bear arms
contained within Texas’s constitution.103 And there is the fact that weapons were so
widely carried. Although this fact does not necessarily imply that weapon carriers
thought they had a constitutional right to do so, combined with the other evidence,
it does suggest that the popular understanding of the right to bear arms extended

96. See, e.g., Dano v. Collins, 802 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990); Sutton v.
State, 12 Fla. 135, 136 (1867); Stockdale v. State, 32 Ga. 225, 227–28 (1861); State v.
Button, 37 P.3d 23, 25 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001); State v. McAdams, 714 P.2d 1236, 1238
(Wyo. 1986).
97. Beware of Carrying Deadly Weapons, supra note 87; see also Eugene Volokh,
Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework
and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1522–23 (2009) (quoting and explaining
an 1820 Richmond grand jury that inveighed against carrying weapons secretly).
98. State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612 (1840); State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1842); Nunn v. State,
1 Ga. 243 (1846); State v. Mitchell, 3 Blackf. 229 (Ind. 1833); Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12
Ky. (2 Litt.) 90 (1822); State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489 (1850); Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn.
(2 Hum.) 154 (1840); cf. Simpson v. State, 13 Tenn. (5 Yer.) 356 (1833) (refusing to allow
prosecution for going armed to the terror of the people, a common-law offense that the
Tennessee legislature tried to recognize in 1801).
99. Virginia’s constitutional provision was passed in 1971. See Eugene Volokh, State
Constitutional Rights to Keep and Bear Arms, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 191, 215 (2006)
(citing VA. CONST. art. I, § 13 (right added to preexisting 1776 provision extolling the
popular militia)).
100. Bliss, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90.
101. LOUISVILLE PUB. ADVERTISER, Sept. 10, 1825.
102. Reid, 1 Ala. 612.
103. TELEGRAPH & TEX. REG. (Hous.), Jan. 23, 1839, at 3.
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beyond militia service. State courts, thus, adjudicated right-to-bear-arms claims
against a backdrop of a public divided between a faction believing in the right to
carry personal weapons publicly and another faction demanding that weapon
carrying cease entirely because of the social externalities.
2. The Compromise of State Courts
State supreme courts responded to the divided public by compromising on the
scope of the right to bear arms. Unlike the First Amendment, which did not receive
significant judicial interpretation until the twentieth century, the Second
Amendment and state analogues were heavily litigated in the nineteenth century.
During the antebellum period, there were approximately two dozen cases that
offered some guidance on the scope of the right to bear arms under the Second
Amendment and state analogues.104
Most courts recognized a robust right to carry arms in public—often regardless
of the precise way in which the state analogue of the right to bear arms was
worded—but nevertheless recognized the state’s police power to regulate the right
for public safety. This was the origin of the “regulation/prohibition” distinction that
Winkler identifies.105 But the content of the right to bear arms, to which the
regulation/prohibition distinction applied, was framed around contemporaneous
understandings of the right to bear arms. The compromise position recognized a
right to carry weapons in public—but not to conceal the weapons. The right to bear
arms was then enforced against outlying jurisdictions that adopted unusually
extreme legislation—just like how Heller and McDonald struck down unusually
restrictive complete handgun bans.106
The compromise position of accommodating contemporaneous understandings
of the right to bear arms—both in terms of the right and its limitations—developed

104. This number comes from a search on Westlaw using all reported cases of “bear
arms” in state courts and excluding those cases dealing solely with military service. The
cases found track what other researchers have discovered in compiling the early cases. See
CRAMER, supra note 10; see also O’Shea, supra note 10, at 623–37 (analyzing the
antebellum cases and categorizing them by the scope of the right protected).
105. See Winkler, Reasonable, supra note 11; Winkler, Scrutinizing, supra note 11.
106. See Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846) (striking down prohibition on unconcealed
weapons); see also Reid, 1 Ala. at 615 (allowing ban on concealed weapons because persons
could carry arms openly); State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489 (1850); Simpson v. State, 13
Tenn. (5 Yer.) 356 (1833) (not allowing common-law prosecution for going armed to the
terror of the people for fear that someone’s unease at seeing a weapon would vitiate the right
to bear arms). Heller and McDonald, likewise, only struck down complete bans on handguns
that affected the District of Columbia, the City of Chicago, and a few Chicago suburbs. See,
e.g., Quilici v. Vill. of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982) (sustaining handgun ban
of a Chicago suburb); Brief for the National Rifle Association and the NRA Civil Rights
Defense Fund as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 28, District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290) (noting that, of major cities, only the District of
Columbia and Chicago had handgun bans and that San Francisco’s ban had been struck
down by state courts on state preemption grounds); Robert VerBruggen, Self-Defense vs.
Municipal Gun Bans, REASON, June 2005, at 40 (discussing Chicago suburbs). Most states
have preemption laws that forbid municipalities from banning or regulating handguns.
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fairly quickly. Two early state courts that took absolutist positions found their
doctrines quickly abandoned.
Bliss v. Commonwealth107 was the first case litigated on the right to bear arms.
Bliss was charged with having a sword concealed in a cane and was fined $100.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed in a 2–1 decision. Kentucky defended the
law on the grounds that a prohibition on concealed weapons merely regulated the
manner of bearing arms and was not a complete destruction of the right.108 Over an
unpublished dissent, the majority rejected this argument. While the court
acknowledged that a prohibition on concealed weapons was not “an entire
destruction of the right of the citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and the
state,” the court held that “whatever restrains the full and complete exercise of that
right, though not an entire destruction of it, is forbidden by the explicit language of
the constitution.”109 And the court defined the right to bear arms as the same liberty
to wear weapons that existed at the time of the Kentucky Constitution’s adoption.
The Tennessee Supreme Court likewise took an absolutist position in Simpson v.
State.110 In that case, the defendant was charged with an affray, but since he had not
engaged in actual fighting, the court examined whether to recognize the commonlaw offense of going armed with dangerous or unusual weapons to the terror of the
people.111 Unlike Heller, which saw the common-law prohibition as an early source
of authority to ban military-style rifles,112 the Tennessee Supreme Court declared
that the Tennessee Constitution’s guarantee of “a right [of freemen] to keep and to
bear arms for their common defence” precluded recognizing that common-law
offense.113 The right to bear arms, the court stated, exists “without any qualification
whatever as to their kind or nature.”114 Since the court defined the right to bear
arms to mean that “the people may carry arms,” the court refused to consider the
possibility that publicly carrying weapons could be prohibited solely because some
people might be frightened by exercising the right.115
Neither doctrine would last long. Kentucky’s 1849 constitutional convention
added to its right-to-bear-arms provision that “the general assembly may pass laws
to prevent persons from carrying concealed arms.”116 Similar constitutional
provisions to repudiate Bliss’s doctrine would be adopted throughout the South and
West, most of which are retained in state constitutions today.117 No court dared to

107. 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90 (1822).
108. Id. at 91.
109. Id. at 91–92.
110. 13 Tenn. (5 Yer.) 356 (1833).
111. Id. at 358–60; see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *149 (discussing
the offense).
112. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 621 (2008).
113. Simpson, 13 Tenn. (5 Yer.) at 360 (quoting TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. XI, § 26).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. KY. CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, § 25.
117. Constitutional provisions repudiating the doctrine in Bliss would be adopted in
Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New
Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Utah. See
Volokh, supra note 99, at 193–204 (compiling the historical state constitutional provisions).
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strike down a prohibition only on the carrying of concealed weapons until the
Wisconsin Supreme Court partially invalidated its concealed weapons statute in
2003.118 In Tennessee, the dicta in Simpson was repudiated by Aymette,119 a case
that I will discuss below.120
Against this absolutist approach, states developed a “regulation/prohibition”
doctrine incorporating contemporaneous notions of the right to carry arms publicly.
State v. Reid was the first attempt by a court to flesh this out.121 As I noted above,
Reid involved a sheriff who was charged with carrying a concealed pistol after
being threatened and believing that his life was in danger.122 The Alabama Supreme
Court sustained the act as a mere regulation of the right to bear arms. The court
gave some discussion of the history of the right to bear arms, noting that the
provision derived from the English Bill of Rights, which was designed to give the
people the means of resisting illegal and arbitrary executive power.123
Although the purpose of the right was to resist executive power, the court still
accepted a very broad right to carry arms for private defense. The Alabama
Constitution provided that a citizen had the “right to bear arms in defence of

118. State v. Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, 264 Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785. Although the
Wisconsin Supreme Court took the nearly unprecedented step of partially invalidating a
concealed weapons statute, it limited its holding mostly to concealed weapons inside a
person’s home or business. See State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d
328 (upholding the facial validity of the concealed weapons statute). The court placed a very
high bar before someone could assert a right to carry a concealed weapon publicly. See State
v. Fisher, 2006 WI 44, ¶ 18, 290 Wis. 2d 121, 714 N.W.2d 495, 499–500. The Delaware
Supreme Court followed Hamdan in Griffin v. State, 47 A.3d 487 (Del. 2012), at least with
respect to the carrying of a concealed weapon in a person’s home. The Ohio Court of
Appeals affirmed a trial court’s attempt to invalidate Ohio’s concealed weapon statute in
2002, but the Ohio Supreme Court quickly reversed. The court reaffirmed that a prohibition
on concealed weapons was a mere regulation of the manner of bearing arms. Klein v. Leis,
99 Ohio St. 3d 537, 2003-Ohio-4779, 795 N.E.2d 633, rev’g 767 N.E.2d 286 (Ohio Ct. App.
2002). The Vermont Supreme Court, in State v. Rosenthal, 55 A. 610 (Vt. 1903), reversed a
person’s conviction for carrying a concealed pistol, but the statute at issue forbade all
carrying of pistols. It is not clear how Vermont would have ruled if the act had only applied
to concealed pistols. The Seventh Circuit invalidated Illinois’s complete prohibition on
carrying weapons, but it is unclear whether that decision translates into a right to have a
concealed weapon or merely some right to carry a weapon outside the home for protection.
See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012). Because California prohibits all
carrying of pistols without a license, the Ninth Circuit has required California counties to
issue licenses to carry concealed pistols without regard to whether applicants can show that
they personally are in special danger of victimization. Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d
1144 (9th Cir. 2014). (A petition for rehearing en banc in Peruta was under review as of the
time of publication.)
119. Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 161–62 (1840).
120. See infra Part I.B.3.a.
121. State v. Mitchell, 3 Blackf. 229 (Ind. 1833), was the first case to approve a
concealed weapons statute. But that case was a one-sentence per curiam opinion simply
stating, “IT was held in this case, that the statute of 1831, prohibiting all persons, except
travellers, from wearing or carrying concealed weapons, is not unconstitutional.”
122. 1 Ala. 612, 612–13 (1840).
123. Id. at 615.
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himself and the State.”124 The Reid court could have very easily said that “defense
of himself” meant self-defense from illegal executive power—the same reason that
Protestants maintained a right to have arms against the Catholic monarchs—and
that carrying a personal weapon for private self-defense was not within the scope of
the right, as historically understood.125 Instead, the Alabama Supreme Court
allowed—consistent with the practice of the time—individuals to carry personal
weapons for self-defense against “lawless aggression and violence.”126 The
prohibition against concealed weapons merely prohibited one manner of exercising
the right to bear arms that proved especially harmful. As long as the legislature did
not require arms to be “render[ed] . . . wholly useless for the purpose of defence”—
that is, prohibit the carrying of them openly127—the legislature had the power to
regulate the right.128 The court then quoted Bliss at length and explicitly rejected its
absolutist position.129
One might argue that Reid’s analysis of the right to bear arms is irrelevant for
the Second Amendment. The Alabama Constitution explicitly guaranteed the right
to bear arms “in defence of himself,” which is arguably broader than the Second
Amendment’s mere reference to “the right of the people to keep and bear arms.”
Moreover, Alabama’s constitution lacks the militia prefatory language.
Although antebellum courts did sometimes briefly parse the different
constitutional language, state courts never grounded their decisions in the minor
variations in language. In fact, their decisions were remarkably uniform on the
scope of the right. The theory underlying this was that both the federal and the
various state constitutions “confer[red] no new rights on the people which did not
belong to them before.”130 Whatever their minor variations in language, both the
state and federal right-to-bear-arms provisions codified the same preexisting right.
The various constitutions may have used different language to express the same
proposition—but courts treated the proposition as identical despite these variations
in language.
If one looks at the judicial outcomes, the decisions are mostly consistent
regardless of the specific wording of the constitutional provision. Nunn v. State,
which was cited in Heller, invalidated Georgia’s prohibition on openly carried
pistols while affirming the constitutionality of its ban on concealed weapons.131

124. ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 23.
125. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
126. Reid, 1 Ala. at 617.
127. Id. at 616; see also id. at 619 (“[W]e incline to the opinion that the Legislature cannot
inhibit the citizen from bearing arms openly, because it authorizes him to bear them for the
purposes of defending himself and the State, and it is only when carried openly, that they can be
efficiently used for defence.”). The court’s opinion on this point, however, was not completely
clear. At times, the court’s dicta suggested that the legislature could select the manner of bearing
arms, provided that it left some method to carry arms in public. See id. at 616–17, 618–20
(discussing Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90 (1822)).
128. Id. at 616–17.
129. Id. at 617–20.
130. Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 249 (1846) (emphasis in original).
131. Id. at 251; see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 612–13 (2008) (citing
Nunn).
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Like the Reid court, the Nunn court restricted the legislature to regulating only
concealed weapons. In so doing, the court relied on the Second Amendment,
notwithstanding Barron v. Baltimore.132 In striking down the prohibition on
unconcealed weapons, we see an example of a court curtailing the legislative
authority to regulate the right to bear arms when a legislature strayed beyond the
remainder of the country.
The effect of popular sentiment can also be seen in State v. Chandler,133 a
Louisiana case. Like Nunn, Chandler relied on the Second Amendment, this time in
approving Louisiana’s ban on concealed weapons. The court found that weapons in
open view “place[d] men upon an equality” and was the right secured by the
Second Amendment.134 Six years later, in State v. Smith,135 the court determined
that the Second Amendment applied only to those arms “such as are borne by a
people in war, or at least carried openly.”136 The militia language in the Second
Amendment did not limit the right to bear arms to carrying them in war; it included
carrying them openly outside of war as well—consistent with the prevailing view
of the time. Again, like in Reid and Nunn, the legislature could only regulate
concealed weapons, rather than select the manner of bearing arms.
Perhaps most remarkable was State v. Huntly,137 which arguably ignored textual
limitations in its state constitutional provision. Huntly was an antebellum North
Carolina Supreme Court case that, like Simpson, considered whether the state
would recognize the common-law offense of going armed to the terror of the
people. Huntly was indicted after openly arming himself with a gun and threatening
to kill another man over the possession of certain slaves.138 The North Carolina
Constitution only guaranteed the right to bear arms for “defence of the State.”139 If
any state constitutional right were to be limited to militia service, North Carolina’s
would qualify. Yet, the opinion does not even contain the word “militia.”
The North Carolina Supreme Court, unlike the Tennessee court in Simpson, did
recognize the common-law offense. As a preliminary matter, in contrast to Heller,
the Huntly court held that all guns were “unusual weapons.”140 Although gun

132. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (holding that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the
states).
133. 5 La. Ann. 489 (1850).
134. Id. at 490; cf. Samuel L. Bray, Power Rules, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1172 (2010)
(discussing different ways in which the law protects vulnerable people from more powerful
ones).
135. 11 La. Ann. 633 (1856).
136. Id. at 633.
137. 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 418 (1843).
138. Id. at 418–19.
139. Id. at 422 (quoting N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, § XVII).
140. Id. (“It has been remarked, that a double-barrelled gun, or any other gun, cannot in
this country come under the description of ‘unusual weapons,’ for there is scarcely a man in
the community who does not own and occasionally use a gun of some sort. But we do not
feel the force of this criticism. A gun is an ‘unusual weapon,’ wherewith to be armed and
clad. No man amongst us carries it about with him, as one of his every day accoutrements—
as a part of his dress—and never we trust will the day come when any deadly weapon will be
worn or wielded in our peace loving and law-abiding State, as an appendage of manly
equipment.”).
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ownership was common, the court felt that it was unusual to carry a gun at all
times as part of one’s everyday dress.141
Even if it was unusual, the court took great pains to explain that citizens were
“at perfect liberty” to carry a gun “[f]or any lawful purpose—either of business or
amusement.”142 The court held that Huntly’s conduct was punishable because his
carrying of the gun—for the purpose of terrifying others and in such manner as
would terrify the public—was an abuse of the right to bear arms.143 The court did
not hold—as it could have—that carrying weapons for purposes other than
defending the state fell outside the right to bear arms.
When state courts approved significant limitations on the right to bear arms
outside of the mainstream, they did so on the grounds that the person—generally a
free black—fell outside the constitutional guarantee. The North Carolina Supreme
Court, in State v. Newsom,144 approved a statute requiring free blacks to obtain a
license to possess or carry a firearm. The Newsom court did make a brief attempt at
arguing that the statute was a regulation, not a prohibition of the right. The court
said that the statute did not “deprive the free man of color of the right to carry arms
about his person, but subjects it to the control of the County Court, giving them the
power to say, in the exercise of a sound discretion, who, of this class of persons,
shall have a right to the licence, or whether any shall.”145 But the court was fairly
transparent in holding that this statute was a “regulation” only as it applied to
nonwhites, whose constitutional rights were less. The court repeatedly argued that
“free people of color have been among us, as a separate and distinct class,
requiring, from necessity, in many cases, separate and distinct legislation.”146 The
decision left little doubt that licensing white citizens in the same manner would be
unconstitutional. Licensing the right to bear arms might be a mere “regulation” of
the right to bear arms in 2011,147 but it was almost certainly a “prohibition” for full
citizens in 1844.148 Dred Scott would follow thirteen years later, saying that free
blacks could never be full citizens, lest they have a right “to keep and carry arms
wherever they went.”149

141. Id.
142. Id. at 423.
143. Id.
144. 27 N.C. (5 Ired.) 250 (1844).
145. Id. at 253.
146. Id. at 252; see also id. at 254.
147. See, e.g., Kwong v. Bloomberg, 723 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2013) (upholding New York
City’s $340 licensing fee); Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (largely upholding the District’s registration requirements post-Heller); see also
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 631 (2008) (refusing to address the licensing
requirement because Heller did not challenge nondiscriminatory licensing).
148. See also State v. Kerner, 107 S.E. 222 (N.C. 1921) (striking down a local
requirement to obtain a license to carry a pistol openly).
149. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 417 (1857).
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3. Antebellum Outliers
The antebellum period had two outlier cases that did not fit neatly into
recognizing the right to bear arms in conjunction with the contemporaneous
understanding. The first was a Tennessee case, Aymette v. State,150 that provided
the civic republican version of the right to bear arms that would take hold in the
second half of the nineteenth century. The second, the Arkansas case State v.
Buzzard,151 arguably provided the first precedent for the collective rights view that
predominated in the twentieth century.
a. Aymette v. State
Although chronologically, Aymette was the fifth significant case on the right to
bear arms—after Bliss, Mitchell,152 Reid, and Simpson—intellectually, Aymette
occupies a transitional position. Like most antebellum courts, Aymette seemingly
accepted a general right to bear arms openly, despite the Tennessee Constitution
only granting a “right to keep and to bear arms for their common defence.”153 But
this recognition of a broad right is arguable—and almost forced—for reasons I will
explain below.
On the other hand, Aymette provided the intellectual foundation for the civic
republican theory of the right to bear arms—the theory that would take hold in the
late eighteen hundreds.154 Aymette was the primary authority on which the Supreme
Court relied in United States v. Miller.155 Its influence over Second Amendment
jurisprudence was so profound that, until Heller, it was the single most important
opinion ever delivered on the right to bear arms. Although Justice Scalia unfairly
maligned the opinion in Heller,156 the opinion is far more “originalist” than Heller
or McDonald’s supposedly historical analysis in defining the purpose and scope of
the right to bear arms.
William Aymette was convicted of violating Tennessee’s 1838 law against
carrying concealed Bowie knives. He had had an argument with another man and
responded by later attempting to track him down at a hotel to kill him. As Aymette
was searching for the man in various places, he occasionally drew his knife, which
led to his concealed weapons charge. The court sentenced Aymette to a $200 fine
and the statutory minimum three months’ imprisonment.157

150. 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154 (1840).
151. 4 Ark. 18 (1842).
152. Mitchell was a one-sentence per curiam opinion affirming Indiana’s concealed
weapon statute. See supra note 121.
153. TENN. CONST. of 1835, art. I, § 26 (“That the free white men of this State have a
right to keep and to bear arms for their common defence.”). Tennessee had amended its state
constitution in 1835 to exclude free blacks, who were arguably protected by the 1796
constitution. TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. XI, § 26 (“That the freemen of this State have a
right to keep and to bear arms for their common defence.”).
154. O’Shea, supra note 10, at 632–34.
155. 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).
156. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 613–14 (2008).
157. Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 154–55 (1840).
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The opinion, written by Judge Nathan Green, Sr., began by giving a brief history
of the purpose of the right to bear arms. The right to bear arms, he correctly
recognized,158 had its origins in the Glorious Revolution. The opinion skips much
of the revolutionary details about the struggles between Parliament and the Crown:
seventeenth-century England was torn between Catholic monarchs and a
predominantly Protestant population. When debates over control of the nation’s
military forces reached an impasse, King Charles I sent a small contingent of a
standing army—which did not even exist in England until the seventeenth
century—to arrest members of Parliament. This action triggered a civil war
between backers of Parliament and the Crown.159
Judge Green’s opinion picked up after the Restoration. He noted that
seventeenth-century English law only permitted subjects whose lands had a clear
yearly value in excess of £100 or those whose social rank was above esquire to
have guns.160 Even among this limited group, King James II—without
parliamentary sanction—disarmed the Protestants and quartered Catholic soldiers
among the population to enforce his rule. By disarming the Protestant population
and turning the army against the majority of the people, King James II enforced his
rule in derogation of Parliament and, by extension, popular legitimacy. Judge
Green wrote:
The evil that was produced by disarming the people in the time of
James II[] was that the king, by means of a standing army quartered
among the people, was able to overawe them, and compel them to
submit to the most arbitrary, cruel, and illegal measures. Whereas, if
the people had retained their arms, they would have been able, by a just
and proper resistance to those oppressive measures, either to have
caused the king to respect their rights, or surrender (as he was
eventually compelled to do) the government into other hands. No
private defence was contemplated, or would have availed anything. If
the subjects had been armed, they could have resisted the payment of
excessive fines, or the infliction of illegal and cruel punishments.
When, therefore, Parliament says that “subjects which are Protestants
may have arms for their defence, suitable to their condition, as allowed
by law,” it does not mean for private defence, but, being armed, they
may as a body rise up to defend their just rights, and compel their rulers
to respect the laws. This declaration of right is made in reference to the
fact before complained of, that the people had been disarmed, and
soldiers had been quartered among them contrary to law. The complaint
was against the government.161
As a matter of original interpretation, this is considerably more accurate than
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Heller. It comports with Madison’s

158. Id. at 156. See generally JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE
ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT (1994).
159. MALCOLM, supra note 158, at 16–23; see also id. at 58–76 (discussing the
continuing conflicts after the Restoration).
160. 22 & 23 Car. II, c. 25, § 2 (1671); see also Aymette, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) at 156.
161. Aymette, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) at 157.
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understanding of the right to bear arms in Federalist Number 46, in which Madison
explains that an armed populace could resist government oppression.162 Justice
Story offers a similar view.163 And it better fits with Blackstone’s quotations, which
Heller selectively—and misleadingly—edits.164 Aymette also argues—contrary to
Justice Stevens’s analysis in Heller165—that early state constitutional provisions
guaranteeing citizens the right to bear arms “in defence of themselves” meant in
defense of the citizenry at large against oppression, not individual self-defense
against criminals.166 Under Judge Green’s view, the Second Amendment and the
state analogues are broader than the English right, though they serve the same
purpose.167
The purpose of the right to keep and bear arms informs the content of that
right.168 Because the right is about resisting oppression, Judge Green draws several
conclusions about the right’s content. First, the right covers only those weapons
that are “employed in civilized warfare, and that constitute the ordinary military
equipment”—personal arms that citizens would carry “in their hands” to repel
invasions of their rights.169 Weapons that are used to commit crimes or in private
fights, such as the Bowie knife, are not constitutionally protected “arms.”
Second, although the right to bear arms is a “great political right,” it is subject to
legislative regulation to ensure that the right is not abused. Here, the opinion draws
a very crucial distinction between the right to keep arms and the right to bear
arms.170 Citizens have an unqualified right to keep constitutionally protected arms
in their homes.171 This makes the weapons available if they are needed to provide

162. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 321–22 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed. 1961).
163. STORY, supra note 43, §§ 1889–1890, at 746–47; cf. Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 1, 52–53 (1820) (Story, J., dissenting) (stating that the Second Amendment does not
appear to have any “important bearing” on whether a state has concurrent power to arm the
militia).
164. See infra notes 368–71 and accompanying text.
165. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 642–43 (2008) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
166. Aymette, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) at 160–61. On the civic republican meaning of “in
defence of themselves,” see generally Nathan Kozuskanich, Defending Themselves: The
Original Understanding of the Right to Bear Arms, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 1041 (2007).
167. Unlike the English provision, the American right to bear arms is not limited by one’s
status in life; all citizens have the right to bear arms, regardless of their net worth. Aymette,
21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) at 157–58.
168. This is also what United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178–79 (1939), was
following when Justice McReynolds wrote that the Second Amendment must be viewed with
a purpose toward maintaining the militia.
169. Aymette, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) at 158–59.
170. Id. This also provides powerful evidence that, unlike Michael Dorf’s argument (and
a similar argument in Justice Stevens’s dissent), “the right to keep and bear arms” was not
commonly understood as a unitary phrase. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570,
651 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Michael C. Dorf, What Does the Second Amendment
Mean Today?, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 291, 317 (2000).
171. Aymette, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) at 160 (“The citizens have the unqualified right to keep
the weapon, it being of the character before described as being intended by this provision.
But the right to bear arms is not of that unqualified character. [T]he citizens may bear them
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for the common defense against oppression. When collective rights opinions cite
Aymette as supporting their argument172—usually because the opinion says “bear
arms” refers exclusively to war173—they miss the unrestrained notion of the right to
keep arms in Aymette. Aymette does not limit the right to have arms only to when
the government enrolls the person in a well-regulated militia. If this were the limit
of the right, then the government could refuse to enroll people in the militia and the
people would have no right to possess arms—which means that there would be no
impediment to illegal executive power.174
In contrast to the right to keep arms in the home, the right to bear arms in public
is more limited, since the purpose of allowing citizens to carry weapons is to
provide for the common defense.175 Citizens have peacetime duties when
exercising their right to bear arms—for example, not showing up to a public
gathering heavily armed to the terror of the people. The legislature may regulate
abuses of the right with criminal penalties.176
As a corollary of this second point, Judge Green argues that there is a “manifest”
distinction between openly carried weapons and concealed weapons. When one
bears arms for the common defense, the arms—such as rifles, muskets, and swords
(note that pistols and knives are not included in the list)—have to be carried openly,
as they would be in warfare. To deny the right to bear arms openly is to destroy the
right, whereas this is not true for carrying weapons concealed.177
But in this last point, we see the transitional nature of Aymette. Judge Green
could have argued—as did many courts during the late eighteen hundreds178—that
the legislature could mostly restrict the right to bear arms, while maintaining a
broad right to keep arms in the home. Someone carrying a rifle in public on a
random occasion likely does not bear arms with the common defense in mind. The
rationale of Aymette would seemingly support a legislative decision completely
for the common defence; but it does not follow that they may be borne by an individual,
merely to terrify the people or for purposes of private assassination.”).
172. E.g., Heller, 554 U.S. at 613–14 (majority opinion) (noting that Aymette is cited by
those advocating restricting the right to the militia); id. at 648 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1073 (9th Cir. 2002).
173. Aymette, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) at 161.
174. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 596; Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165, 182–85
(1871).
175. See, e.g., Lucilius A. Emery, The Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 28
HARV. L. REV. 473 (1915). Although this article has been widely cited by federal cases
adopting the collective rights holding, Emery actually takes the Aymette approach of a broad
right to keep war arms and a limited right to bear them; he sees defense of the community as
the right’s primary justification, with personal protection against criminals, at best, a
secondary concern. See id. at 476–77.
176. Aymette, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) at 159–60.
177. Id. at 160–61.
178. See, e.g., Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 472, 475–76, 479–80 (1874) (recognizing an
“absolute” right to keep arms but upholding prohibition on carrying weapons in many
locations and in a concealed manner); State v. Wilburn, 66 Tenn. 57, 62–63 (1872)
(upholding prohibition against carrying all pistols, except openly in the hand); State v. Duke,
42 Tex. 455, 459 (1874) (upholding law that restricted the carrying of pistols to homes,
places of business, when needed for public service, and in emergency defensive
circumstances).
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prohibiting weapons in public, except for militia duty or for individual incidents
related to militia duty (e.g., bringing the gun home from a place of purchase or the
person going target shooting, on his own accord, to increase his proficiency with
the weapon).179 Nevertheless, Judge Green still sees—consistent with the
antebellum sentiment—that “a prohibition to bear them openly would be a denial of
the right altogether.”180 This shows the profound constraining influence that
contemporaneous popular sentiment of the right to bear arms has over courts’
interpretations, even when, intellectually, judges think the right should have
different dimensions.
Aymette thus fills a transitional role. It provides the intellectual framework for
the second half of the nineteenth century, when the right to bear arms in public
would be sharply curtailed. But, like nearly all antebellum cases, Aymette also
recognizes a general right to bear arms openly. The right to keep and bear arms,
according to Judge Green, is the right to keep military rifles, muskets, and swords
in the home and to bear them openly in public.
b. State v. Buzzard
The second major outlier is State v. Buzzard.181 Buzzard, another concealed
weapons case, is the only antebellum case that arguably takes a view that the
Second Amendment belongs only to the militia. The case had limited precedential
value in the nineteenth century—after the Civil War, Arkansas (the only state to
adopt it) abandoned the doctrine in favor of the Tennessee approach182—but it
became the predominant federal court approach beginning in the 1930s.183
Making matters more complicated, Buzzard has no court opinion. The 1842
Arkansas Supreme Court had three judges, and the opinions in Buzzard were
delivered seriatim. The full court’s holding is unclear. Two of the three judges—
Chief Justice Daniel Ringo and Justice Townsend Dickinson—argue that the right
belongs to “the people” solely so they may perform militia-related objectives.184
Justice Thomas J. Lacy, in dissent, argues that the right includes personal defense.
He also accuses Justice Dickinson of holding that “it is the militia alone who
possess this right in contradistinction from the mass of the people.”185 I think
Justice Lacy is wrong about Justice Dickinson’s opinion, for reasons I will discuss
momentarily.186 But if I am incorrect about this assessment, then we have a
Bakke-style breakdown: Justice Dickinson argues that the right is limited to militia

179. See Andrews, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) at 178–79, which later took this approach.
180. Aymette, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) at 161.
181. 4 Ark. 18 (1842); see also George A. Mocsary, Note, Explaining Away the Obvious:
The Infeasibility of Characterizing the Second Amendment as a Nonindividual Right, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 2113, 2148 (2008) (analyzing the opinions in Buzzard).
182. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 33 Ark. 557 (1878); Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455 (1876); see
also infra note 360 (recounting the history).
183. See United States v. Adams, 11 F. Supp. 216 (S.D. Fla. 1935); see also infra Part III
(recounting the post-Miller history).
184. Buzzard, 4 Ark. at 24–25 (opinion of Ringo, C.J.); id. at 30 (opinion of Dickinson, J.).
185. Id. at 35 (opinion of Lacy, J., dissenting).
186. See infra notes 201–06 and accompanying text.
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service; Justice Lacy would hold that it encompasses the private use of arms; and
Chief Justice Ringo opines, like Aymette, that the right is not limited to those
enrolled in the militia, but the right exists only for the purpose of public defense.
Chief Justice Ringo’s opinion reads similarly to Aymette: the right to bear arms
is designed to allow resistance to “those who should conspire to overthrow the
established institutions of the country, or subjugate their common liberties.”187
Much of his opinion is dedicated to refuting that the right to bear arms is
absolute—which Chief Justice Ringo feared it would be if it were disconnected
from its militia-related objective.188 Justice Dickinson makes a similar argument in
his opinion.189
Language in both majority opinions gives some support to the collective rights
view. Chief Justice Ringo, for example, does state that the right “enable[s] the
militia to discharge this most important trust [i.e., prevent overthrow of the
government], so reposed in them, and for this purpose only, it is conceived the right
to keep and bear arms was retained.”190 Justice Dickinson refers to the “power
given the militia to keep and bear arms”191 as well as the power of the state to
regulate weapons “when . . . not required or necessary for military purposes.”192 He
further writes, “The militia constitutes the shield and defence for the security of a
free State; and to maintain that freedom unimpaired, arms and the right to use them
for that purpose are solemnly guarantied.”193 Chief Justice Ringo’s quotation, along
with its surrounding text, provided support to the government’s brief in United
States v. Miller, when the government cited Buzzard as one of three American
cases holding that the right to bear arms only belongs to people serving in a
militia.194 One person who compiled a history of state court decisions on the right
to bear arms called it “by far the most extreme statement in opposition to an
individual right to keep and bear arms in the period before the Civil War.”195
Treating Buzzard as a collective rights decision overreads the opinions. Both
majority opinions treat “militia” as synonymous with “able-bodied free white
men”; neither suggests that the right to bear arms is limited to only those citizens
who are currently enrolled in highly regulated, constantly drilling militia units (i.e.,
“select militia”).196 Indeed, Justice Dickinson says that the “militia” is “necessarily

187. Buzzard, 4 Ark. at 24–25 (opinion of Ringo, C.J.).
188. Id. at 21–22. A similar jurisprudential concern occurred in federal courts after
Miller. See infra text accompanying note 326.
189. Buzzard, 4 Ark. at 30–32 (opinion of Dickinson, J.).
190. Id. at 25 (opinion of Ringo, C.J.).
191. Id. at 30 (opinion of Dickinson, J.).
192. Id. at 32.
193. Id.
194. See Brief for the United States, supra note 32, at 16–18. The other two cases were
City of Salina v. Blaksley, 83 P. 619 (Kan. 1905), and United States v. Adams, 11 F. Supp.
216 (S.D. Fla. 1935). The latter case was the first reported decision on the constitutionality
of the National Firearms Act of 1934. See infra text accompanying note 294.
195. CRAMER, supra note 10, at 82.
196. See Buzzard, 4 Ark. at 27 (opinion of Ringo, C.J.) (treating the “free white men”
provision in the right to bear arms as securing the state’s “republican institutions,” that is, the
militia).
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composed of the people”; unlike the collective rights view, he does not suggest that
the “militia” includes only that subset of people whom the government chooses to
enroll for military service.197 Moreover, Justice Dickinson’s opinion rejects the
states’ rights theory of the Second Amendment. He writes, “It is not contended that
the General Assembly of this State could interfere with any regulations made by
Congress, as to the organizing, arming, or disciplining the militia, or in the manner
in which that militia are either to keep or bear their arms.”198
Justice Lacy, in dissent, takes a libertarian view of the right to bear arms: he
recognizes only the power of the state to regulate the dangerous use of weapons.199
He argues that if the right to bear arms means nothing more than the right of a state
to arm a militia, then the right is worthless since the state has that power anyway.200
Contrary to the majority, Justice Lacy views the militia as including only those
citizens designated by state authority as enrolled in military service.201 As a result,
if the majority’s view were correct, the state could deprive people of their arms by
not enrolling them in military service. For Justice Lacy, the right to bear arms
means the “privilege of the people to keep and to bear their private arms, for the
necessary defence of their person, habitation, and property, or for any useful or
innocent purpose whatever.”202
Justice Lacy’s opinion is probably closest to the prevailing model that
dominated other state courts.203 Even though the Arkansas Constitution guaranteed
the right to bear arms “for the common defence,” his opinion recognized the right
as being much broader.204 The majority, of course, disagreed, holding that the right
to bear arms exists only for purposes of public defense. With the possible exception

197. Id. at 30 (opinion of Dickinson, J.) (emphasis added); see also Eugene Volokh, The
Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 802–04 (1998) (explaining that
the militia has generally included the entire able-bodied political community). One might
object that Justice Dickinson was simply referencing the popular militia of the nineteenth
century. This would be wrong for two reasons. First, Justice Dickinson treats the militia as
“necessarily composed of the people,” not contingently composed. Buzzard, 4 Ark. at 30.
Second, the universal militia system largely died after the War of 1812. See, e.g., H.
RICHARD UVILLER & WILLIAM G. MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMS, OR, HOW
THE SECOND AMENDMENT FELL SILENT 119–26 (2002); Frederick Bernays Wiener, Militia
Clause of the Constitution, 54 HARV. L. REV. 181, 188–93 (1940). Those who argue that
“times have changed” and that today’s “well-regulated militia” does not involve universal
service ignore the fact that many antebellum cases, including Buzzard, arose thirty years
following the collapse of the universal militia system and the primary emergence of
volunteer units.
198. Buzzard, 4 Ark. at 29 (opinion of Dickinson, J.).
199. See id. at 39–40 (opinion of Lacy, J., dissenting) (“[I]f the right be innocent of itself,
it cannot be interdicted; but its unlawful exercise, degenerating into licentiousness, is subject
to regulation.”).
200. Id. at 35–36.
201. See id. at 35.
202. Id. at 43.
203. But Justice Lacy would have struck down the prohibition on concealed weapons, so
this places him closer to Bliss—and on the far end of the individual rights spectrum.
204. See ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. II, § 21 (“That the free white men of this State shall
have a right to keep and to bear arms for their common defence.”).

2014]

OUR NON-ORIGINALIST RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS

1619

of Justice Dickinson’s opinion, no antebellum judicial authority supports limiting
the right to bear arms to service in the militia. Nor does any authority suggest that
the right is limited to the select (or volunteer) militia, even though the universal
militia largely became extinct after the War of 1812.
In limiting the right to keep and bear arms to the right to have individual
weapons of war for the purpose of resisting oppression, Buzzard and Aymette cut
strongly against the prevailing broad view of the antebellum right to bear arms. But
this view of the right to bear arms would predominate after the Civil War, when
courts would struggle to adapt the right to bear arms against new social pressures to
control handgun violence.
II. THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS DURING AND FOLLOWING RECONSTRUCTION
The antebellum right to bear arms was a struggle between a divided citizenry,
those who viewed public weapons as a nuisance and those who maintained a strong
belief in the right to bear arms in public for individual purposes. Antebellum courts
generally synthesized a compromise position that recognized both positions: allow
states to prohibit only concealed weapons to control crime, while recognizing a
broad right to bear arms openly, whether or not related to militia duty. The three
courts that did not strike this compromise—two finding an absolute right to bear
arms (the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Bliss and the Tennessee Supreme Court in
Simpson) and one court limiting the right only to military purposes (the Arkansas
Supreme Court in Buzzard)—found their doctrines overturned.
The post–Civil War period marked a failure of the antebellum compromise.
Handguns proliferated after the Civil War, and concealed weapons bans largely
proved inadequate to stem crimes committed with them. Legislatures and the
people clamored for new authority to regulate—and even prohibit—handguns.
Moreover, legislatures faced new challenges, including minors with guns, persons
showing up to court armed, armed persons “intimidating” voters at the polls with
weapons,205 armed corporations breaking strikes, and the new legal recognition of
blacks as full citizens with a right to have guns—something the Southern white
community feared and resented.206 The scope of the popularly accepted right to
bear arms changed.
Faced with new pressures to allow legislatures to regulate guns more
extensively, courts largely altered the scope of the right to bear arms. The right to
bear arms following the Civil War was primarily the right contained in Aymette: a
broad right to keep arms in the home, but a very limited right to have arms in
public. Legislatures could regulate the right to carry handguns in a manner that
made the right extremely difficult to exercise (e.g., limiting the right to militarystyle revolvers carried openly in the hand). Constitutionally protected “arms” were
only those arms constituting the “ordinary military equipment”—arms, such as

205. Of course, many times these were Union soldiers guarding the polls and preventing
the intimidation of blacks.
206. I am omitting discussion of the Black Codes, which, among other things, required
the freedmen to obtain licenses before possessing firearms. These laws were overturned by
Congress. See Stefan B. Tahmassebi, Gun Control and Racism, 2 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J.
67, 71 (1991).
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rifles, appropriate for individual citizens to use when in military service. Handguns
received little constitutional protection after the Civil War, with the exception that a
majority of courts recognized at least the right to have military-style revolvers.
Courts also reconstructed the “regulation/prohibition” distinction to fit the new
legislative framework. Total prohibitions on carrying guns in certain places would
be “regulations”—not prohibitions—provided they were not overbroad. This
supplanted the old theory that prohibitions on concealed weapons did not restrict
the right to bear arms because such laws merely prescribed the manner in which
arms were borne.
A. Community Standards and the Legislative Framework
Before the Civil War, gun control revolved primarily around concealed
weapons, dueling, and honor-related killings. After the Civil War, the primary
concern of legislatures was crime committed with handguns. Beginning in the
1870s—and continuing at various times throughout the twentieth century—states
began banning the sale and carrying of handguns. Tennessee and Arkansas imposed
this through outright bans on all handguns, except army- or navy-model
revolvers.207 Alabama, Texas, and Virginia taxed dealers or imposed transfer taxes
on the sale of pistols.208 North Carolina imposed a property tax.209
Although many commentators today malign these Southern laws as racist—
which they were—they also had legitimate crime-control objectives, and calls for
them were not limited to Southern states. In 1873, a New York grand jury
requested a ban on carrying pistols or concealed weapons.210 A few years later,
these efforts met with some success when the New York City aldermen adopted a
proposal to require a license to carry a pistol.211 The Philadelphia Inquirer reported
in 1880 that carrying pistols had declined in Pennsylvania outside of
Philadelphia.212
Social pressures were clearly turning against carrying guns in public. In 1887, a
Michigan man tried to defend himself against a concealed weapons charge by
claiming that he showed the gun to persons with whom he came into contact and
thus lacked the intent to conceal it. But he testified that he did not wear the gun
openly, “lest people should think him a madman.”213 He pled for an acquittal,
saying that honest citizens needed to be able to carry guns to defend themselves

207. Act of Apr. 1, 1881, No. 96, 1881 Ark. Acts 191, 191–92; Act of Mar. 14, 1879,
ch. 96, 1879 Tenn. Pub. Acts 135, 135–36; see also Tahmassebi, supra note 206, at 74–75.
208. Tahmassebi, supra note 206, at 74–75.
209. Act of Feb. 26, 1867, ch. 72, § 14, 1866–1867 N.C. Pub. Laws 95, 103 (requiring a
tax on pistols and making it a crime to carry a handgun without paying the tax). An 1866 act
required a tax of $50 on pistols, Bowie knives, dirks, sword canes, or other deadly weapons
worn upon the person without the permission of the board of aldermen. Act of Mar. 10,
1866, ch. 7, § 19, 1866–1867 N.C. Priv. Laws 53, 63.
210. Concealed Weapons, HARTFORD DAILY COURANT, Feb. 21, 1873, at 3.
211. The Pistol Ordinance, N.Y. HERALD, Mar. 20, 1878, at 10.
212. The Law Supreme, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 17, 1880, at 4.
213. A Fine Argument: Robert M. Buyse Gives Good Reasons Why He Carried a
Revolver, JACKSON WKLY. CITIZEN (Mich.), Dec. 13, 1887, at 5.
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against robbers—an older form of today’s “if you ban guns, only bad guys will
have them” argument. The newspaper approved of his argument, noting that
robberies were an everyday event.214
Indeed, the population was torn between those who favored banning the
carrying of pistols and those who believed that, if this were done, honest citizens
would be at the mercy of criminals. In 1889, the Knoxville Journal spoke quite
approvingly of Tennessee’s bans on carrying and selling pistols. The newspaper
thought that the ban had reduced heat-of-passion killings and called for a complete
prohibition of handguns.215 These calls were not limited to the South. The San Jose
Evening News reprinted a Templeton Times article calling for people to stop
carrying guns, unless they had a legitimate need.216
On the other hand, many believed that they needed to carry guns for protection.
In 1889, an Omaha news article detailed several people as examples of a “fad” to
carry pistols for protection.217 Members of Congress “very generally carried”
pistols in the Capitol.218 A Louisiana editorial complained that the Louisiana
concealed pistol law was not working and that people needed to carry guns for
protection.219
In addition to these legitimate crime-control objectives, anti-pistol laws had
some racist overtones. There was widespread belief that blacks used guns to
commit crimes against whites. One paper quite bluntly stated that “[e]ven the
stalwarts who believe in John Brown, and regard Lincoln’s emancipation
proclamation as greater than the Sermon on the Mount, carry pistols in this city
now to protect themselves from negro robbers and murderers.”220 An
ex-Confederate officer was asked why he took his gun into an opera house when
only “Democrats” would be present. He responded that he always carried his gun
and thought that was the practice among both whites and blacks.221
Instead of Black Codes, legislatures responded by prohibiting “vagrants” or
“tramps” from carrying weapons.222 Commentators have noted that the ban on
pistols—except army pistols—effectively priced black citizens out of weapons.223
Army pistols were more expensive—out of the price range of most black
Americans—and whites generally retained such pistols from their Civil War

214. Id.
215. The Sacredness of Human Life, KNOXVILLE J., May 10, 1888, at 2.
216. Carrying Pistol, EVENING NEWS (San Jose), Sept. 26, 1887, at 2.
217. People Who Carry Pistols: How the Hip Pocket Fad Has Enveloped Male Omaha in
Its Dangerous Embrace, OMAHA DAILY HERALD, Apr. 28, 1889, at 10.
218. Congressmen Who Carry Pistols: Pocket Pistols Very Generally Carried—
Legislators Who Go Armed, COLUMBUS ENQUIRER-SUN (Ga.), Aug. 6, 1886, at 5.
219. Criminalities: Pistols, DAILY PICAYUNE (New Orleans), May 16, 1874, at 6.
220. The Negroes of the District: The Care Required by the Colored Vagrants,
WHEELING REG. (W. Va.), Feb. 3, 1880, at 1.
221. A Very Frank Witness: Testifies Before the Danville Investigating Committee Today, EVENING CRITIC (D.C.), Feb. 19, 1884, at 3.
222. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 13, 1880, ch. 213, § 2, 1880 Me. Laws 212, 212–13; Act of
Mar. 12, 1879, ch. 198, § 2, 1879 N.C. Laws 355, 355; Act of Apr. 30, 1879, No. 31, § 2,
1879 Pa. Laws 33, 34; Act of Mar. 4, 1879, ch. 188, § 4 Wis. Laws 273, 274.
223. Tahmassabi, supra note 206, at 74–75.
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service.224 Indeed, the effect of the weapons laws was to produce a double standard:
white citizens were usually left alone to possess and carry guns—enforcement of
the law against them was viewed as violating the right to bear arms for defense—
while black citizens were routinely prosecuted.225
There is some evidence that the population also began to divide on whether the
right to bear arms existed for individual defense or only for militia-related
purposes. From Louisiana to New York, articles began to appear which contained
strong statements that the right to bear arms applied to individual self-defense.226
The New York editorial expressed disapproval of police proposals to ban gun
carrying while exempting the police. It argued against the militia-centric view of
the right to bear arms, saying instead that the provision was intended to prevent one
standard for government officers who carry guns and a separate standard for normal
citizens.
But the modern collective rights argument also began to take hold in the
late-1870s in some quarters. In response to armed strikebreaking, Illinois prohibited
groups of people from parading with arms.227 While the law was undergoing court
review, editorials supported it by arguing that the right to bear arms only belonged
to people when they were acting in a state-sponsored “well-regulated militia,” not
in private armed groups.228
The Supreme Court never accepted this militia-only position, instead affirming
the constitutionality of the act on narrower grounds in Presser v. Illinois.229 The
Supreme Court very carefully said that the act did not affect the right of individuals
to bear arms, but only to parade as groups with weapons.230 Indeed, the Court said
that “all citizens capable of bearing arms constitute the . . . reserve militia of the
United States as well as of the States” and that states could not prohibit their
citizens from keeping and bearing arms, since that would deprive the federal
government of its power to call forth the militia.231 But the right to keep and bear
arms, the Court held, did not include the right to band together as armed groups.232

224. Id.
225. The Right to Bear Arms, WKLY. PELICAN (New Orleans), Feb. 9, 1889, at 2; see also
Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, “Never Intended to Be Applied to the White
Population”: Firearms Regulation and Racial Disparity—The Redeemed South’s Legacy to
a National Jurisprudence?, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1307 (1995) (describing the history of
racial disparities in firearms regulation following 1893).
226. Criminalities: Pistols, supra note 219; INDIANAPOLIS SENTINEL, May 15, 1882, at 4
(reprinting article from N.Y. J. COMMERCE).
227. Act of May 28, 1879, art. 11, §§ 5–6, 1879 Ill. Laws 193, 203–04.
228. The Right to Bear Arms, INTER OCEAN (Chi.), June 27, 1879, at 4.
229. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
230. Id. at 264–65.
231. Id. at 265; see also Robert Leider, Federalism and the Military Power of the United
States 91–92 (Sept. 24, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2330648 (explaining Presser’s holding and the theory of the
militia on which it relies).
232. Presser, 116 U.S. at 267–68. Arizona and Washington would adopt language in
their state analogues of the Second Amendment clarifying that the right to bear arms does
not include the right of private corporations to employ armed groups. See ARIZ. CONST. art.
II, § 26; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 24.
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Thus, post–Civil War courts were being torn in several directions. New
legislation was strictly regulating guns. These included prohibitions on most
handguns, minors having guns,233 carrying a gun while intoxicated, and the
possession of guns in certain locations such as courthouses, polling places, and
public gatherings.234 Many citizens were frustrated with gun crimes, including
robberies and heat-of-passion killings. White Southerners did not want black
Americans possessing guns. At the same time, many citizens wanted the right to
carry guns for personal protection against crime. And labor unions worked to stop
private detective agencies from banding together as armed groups to break up labor
protests. Finally, contemporaneous opinions on the scope of the right began to split
between those who thought the right should belong to the government-sponsored
“well-regulated militia”—which now primarily consisted of the National Guard—
and those who retained the belief that the right included private self-defense.
B. The Courts Respond
In response to these competing social pressures, post–Civil War courts
reconceptualized the purpose and scope of the right to keep and bear arms. Instead
of placing a high emphasis on personal defense, the civic republican view
articulated in Aymette took precedence. The only constitutionally protected
weapons were those that had value for militia service—the “ordinary military
equipment.” Most handguns did not qualify. Post–Civil War courts recognized a
broad right to keep arms in the home and, in general, a very limited right to bear
arms in public.235 I should note two caveats: First, like their antebellum
predecessors, different courts deviate from the rules I have identified above, so one
can find a few exceptions in the case law. Second, some of the state constitutional
provisions enacted during the post–Civil War period gave legislatures explicit
authority to regulate the wearing (or bearing) of weapons, instead of the narrower
permission to regulate only concealed weapons.236
As I articulated in Part I, Aymette had three main holdings. The first was that the
only constitutionally protected weapons were those “usually employed in civilized
warfare” and that constituted the “ordinary military equipment.” Second, the right
to keep arms in the home was broader than the right to bear arms in public, the
latter not including the right to carry a weapon concealed. Third, the right to bear
arms was for public—not private—defense. Post–Civil War courts almost

233. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 5, 1883, ch. 105, 1883 Kan. Laws 159 (prohibiting both
minors and those of unsound mind); Act of Feb. 10, 1882, ch. 4, 1882 N.J. Laws 13; Act of
Apr. 3, 1883, ch. 329, 1 1883 Wis. Laws 290.
234. See, e.g., Act of Oct. 18, 1870, No. 285, 1870 Ga. Laws 421; Act of Mar. 16, 1870,
No. 100, § 73, La. Acts 2d Sess. 145, 159–60; Act of Mar. 5, 1883, 1833 Mo. Laws 76
(prohibiting carrying a firearm while intoxicated); Act of Apr. 12, 1871, ch. 34, 1871 Tex.
Laws 1st Sess. Gen. Laws 25; Act of Aug. 15, 1870, ch. 78, § 55, 1870 Texas Laws Gen.
Laws 128, 139.
235. See generally O’Shea, supra note 10, at 641–59 (discussing cases).
236. See FLA. CONST. of 1885, Declaration of Rights, § 20; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. I,
§ 14; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 26; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 26; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 23; TEX.
CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 13; UTAH CONST. of 1895, art. I, § 6.
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unanimously adopted the first holding. With respect to the second holding, no court
during this period found a right to carry a concealed weapon.237 But courts, again,
wobbled on the third issue of whether they would recognize a right to bear arms in
public for private purposes. Most of them did find a right for private purposes, but
they further constrained the constitutional right of gun carrying to make the right to
bear arms for private purposes basically useless. And they recognized that a
legislature has wide latitude to ban guns completely in “sensitive locations,”
provided that the restrictions are not overbroad.
1. What Arms Are Protected?
In the post–Civil War era, the Tennessee Supreme Court would take the lead. In
Andrews v. State,238 the court reaffirmed Aymette, holding that protected arms
included:
Not every thing that may be useful for offense or defense; but what
may properly be included or understood under the title of arms, taken in
connection with the fact that the citizen is to keep them, as a citizen.
Such, then, as are found to make up the usual arms of the citizen of the
country, and the use of which will properly train and render him
efficient in defense of his own liberties, as well as of the State. Under
this head, with a knowledge of the habits of our people, and of the arms
in the use of which a soldier should be trained, we would hold, that the
rifle of all descriptions, the shot gun, the musket, and repeater, are such
arms; and that under the Constitution the right to keep such arms, can
not be infringed or forbidden by the Legislature.239
The court then reversed the convictions of each defendant because the indictments
did not specify the type of pistol. Army revolvers, the full-sized revolvers that were
adopted by the U.S. Army as standard pistols, were constitutionally protected
handguns, and as such, a total ban on them would be void.240 All other handguns
could be prohibited.241 The Arkansas Supreme Court followed suit, holding that an
1875 ban on carrying all pistols (whether openly or concealed) did not apply to
army pistols.242 The court explicitly relied on Aymette and Andrews in reaching its
decision. Georgia applied the term “arms” to militia weapons, such as “guns of

237. Most courts did not comment on the scope of the right to keep arms in the home
since few laws restricted that. I discuss the sparse commentary on the scope of the right
below. See infra Part II.B.2.
238. 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165 (1871).
239. Id. at 179.
240. Id. at 186–87.
241. Id.; see also id. at 192 (issuing holding). Handguns come in different sizes.
Traditionally the military adopts full-sized handguns as its standard-issue pistol. The
distinction between army pistols and other pistols is largely a distinction between larger
handguns that have military value and are difficult to conceal and smaller handguns that
have little military value but are easy to conceal.
242. Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455, 458–61 (1876).
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every kind, swords, bayonets, [and] horseman’s pistols” but not including “pistols,
dirks, Bowie-knives, and those weapons of like character.”243
West Virginia’s Supreme Court of Appeals, assuming that the Second
Amendment applied to the states, listed “swords, guns, rifles, and muskets” as
protected, but “pistols, bowie-knives, brass knuckles, billies, and [other brawling
weapons]” as excluded.244 This was one of the few decisions to exclude handguns
entirely.245
Between 1871 and 1874, the Texas courts took a broader view of permissible
military weapons. In English v. State,246 the Texas Supreme Court held:
The word “arms” in the connection we find it in the constitution of the
United States, refers to the arms of a militiaman or soldier, and the
word is used in its military sense. The arms of the infantry soldier are
the musket and bayonet; of cavalry and dragoons, the sabre, holster
pistols and carbine; of the artillery, the field piece, siege gun, and
mortar, with side arms.247
This holding was under both state and federal constitutional guarantees. This is the
only case I have found that protected weapons (artillery guns) that individuals
could not physically bear, as opposed to only those ordinary personal arms of the
infantry.
In 1874, the Texas Supreme Court reversed course on whether solely military
arms were protected. In State v. Duke,248 the court held that “arms” included “such
arms as are commonly kept, according to the customs of the people, and are
appropriate for open and manly use in self-defense, as well as such as are proper for
the defense of the State.”249 The court held that this included double-barreled
shotguns, the huntsman’s rifle, and pistols not adapted for concealed carry, lest “the
only arms which the great mass of the people of the State have, [would not be]
under constitutional protection.”250 This is the only case to foreshadow the civilian
common-use test announced by Justice Scalia in Heller.251
Thus, by 1900, the almost-unanimous view of state courts was that the “arms”
protected by the Second Amendment and state analogues were only those arms that
citizens would employ in war. They were generally individual weapons that a
citizen would possess and carry, such as rifles, muskets, and army pistols. Weapons
that were not ordinarily employed by soldiers as personal weapons were not
included. This category generally included weapons that were not sufficiently
powerful to be of military value, such as Bowie knives and small pistols—weapons

243.
244.
245.
1908).
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 472, 474 (1874).
State v. Workman, 14 S.E. 9, 11 (W. Va. 1891).
Some later cases also excluded pistols. See, e.g., Ex parte Thomas, 97 P. 260 (Okla.
35 Tex. 473 (1871).
Id. at 476.
42 Tex. 455 (1874).
Id. at 458.
Id. at 458–59.
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 624–25 (2008).

1626

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 89:1587

that were often employed for criminal purposes and which would lead to an
“offense against discipline” if carried by a soldier.252 By curtailing the scope of
protected arms to only militia arms, the courts gave legislatures leeway to regulate
handguns and knives, and to address the social externalities caused by the illegal
use of such weapons.
2. Scope of the Right to Keep Arms
Not a single court, post–Civil War through 1900, held that the right to keep arms
in the home was contingent on active service in a well-regulated militia—even
though the National Guard system already had begun replacing the universal
militia. This was consistent with the majority post–Civil War view that citizens
have a right to keep arms. To the extent that Justice Dickinson’s opinion in Buzzard
suggested it, by the time Fife v. State was decided, Arkansas had firmly abandoned
the militia-only approach in favor of the Tennessee approach articulated by Judge
Green in Aymette.253 No court adopted the collective rights view until 1905, when
the Kansas Supreme Court became the first court in American history to limit the
right to keep and bear arms to only those citizens actively participating in an
organized militia.254
There are very few cases on the right to keep arms during the decades following
the Civil War. Most banned weapons were insufficiently powerful to have military
application, so courts simply held that the weapons at issue were not “arms.” The
Tennessee Supreme Court in Andrews fleshed out fully what the court thought were
the incidents of the right to keep arms. These included the right to purchase arms,
repair them and keep them in a useable state, purchase ammunition, practice
shooting, and use arms for traditionally lawful purposes.255 In Jennings v. State,256
the Texas Court of Appeals did not allow the forfeiture of a pistol that was illegally
carried, saying that the forfeiture violated the defendant’s right to keep the arm.257

252. English, 35 Tex. at 477.
253. See Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455, 458–59 (1876).
254. City of Salina v. Blaksley, 83 P. 619 (Kan. 1905).
255. Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165, 178–79 (1871). This is important to note
for contemporary case law, which is struggling with the question of whether the Second
Amendment extends beyond the home. See, e.g., United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d
458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011) (majority opinion of Wilkinson, J.) (“There may or may not be a
Second Amendment right in some places beyond the home . . . .”); Williams v. State, 10
A.3d 1167, 1177 (Md. 2011) (“If the Supreme Court, in [McDonald’s] dicta, meant its
holding to extend beyond home possession, it will need to say so more plainly.”). As
Andrews makes clear, incidents of the right to keep arms in the home extend beyond the
home. These include the right to carry a gun to and from a place of purchase, repair, or target
practice. Courts, thus, do not mean to ask whether the Second Amendment extends beyond
the home; it clearly does. The actual question they are asking is whether the right extends to
carrying loaded guns outside the home for individual self-defense.
256. 5 Tex. Ct. App. 298 (1878).
257. Id. at 300–01.
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3. Right to Bear Arms
With the increasing social pressure placed on legislatures to curtail handgun
carrying, post–Civil War courts scrutinized legislation restricting public gun
carrying less strictly than they did in the antebellum period. This is perhaps the
most significant transformation of the right to bear arms from the antebellum to the
post–Civil War period.
Unlike the Kentucky antebellum case Bliss, no court during this period upheld a
constitutional right to carry a concealed weapon, regardless of whether claims were
raised under the Second Amendment or state analogues.258 Courts went so far as to
even deny individuals a constitutional right to carry a concealed weapon in their
own homes.259 By 1900, it was clear that the right to carry concealed weapons was
not part of the constitutional right to bear arms.260 Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court
stated in the 1897 case Robertson v. Baldwin261 that the Bill of Rights had
“exceptions, which continued to be recognized as if they had been formally
expressed. Thus, . . . the right of the people to keep and bear arms (art. 2) is not
infringed by laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons . . . .”262
Courts began acknowledging that prohibitions on concealed weapons were
designed to prevent all public carrying of weapons consistent with the right to bear
arms. During the Civil War, the Georgia Supreme Court had held that the purpose
of the concealed weapons statute was to alert people that a person was armed and to
be avoided in a fight.263 The South Carolina Supreme Court understood the South
Carolina statute to have a broader purpose, , asserting that the “purpose was, as far
as may be consistent with the right of the citizen to bear arms, absolutely to
prohibit the carrying of deadly weapons, with a view to prevent acts of violence
and bloodshed.”264 The Louisiana Supreme Court agreed.265
Indeed, for the first time, courts began allowing legislatures generally to prohibit
unconcealed pistols. When the Tennessee Supreme Court held in Andrews that a
ban on carrying pistols could not be applied to all handguns,266 the Tennessee
legislature responded by prohibiting the carrying of all handguns, except army
pistols carried openly in the hand.267 Obviously, this made the carrying of handguns
extremely difficult.268 Nevertheless, the Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the

258. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 11 So. 71 (Ala. 1892); State v. Shelby, 2 S.W. 468 (Mo.
1886); State v. Johnson, 16 S.C. 187 (1881); Andrews, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165.
259. Carroll v. State, 28 Ark. 99 (1872).
260. Wisconsin challenged this convention in 2003 when it found a right to conceal
weapons in the home or a fixed place of business. See supra note 118.
261. 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
262. Id. at 281–82.
263. Stockdale v. State, 32 Ga. 225, 227–28 (1861).
264. Johnson v. State, 16 S.C. 187, 191 (1881).
265. See State v. Bias, 37 La. Ann. 259, 260 (1885).
266. Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165, 192 (1871).
267. Act of Dec. 14, 1871, ch. 90, 1871 Tenn. Pub. Acts 81.
268. Arkansas passed a similar law ten years later. As the Arkansas Supreme Court noted
with reference to its law:
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law.269 A similarly restrictive law was upheld in Arkansas,270 which, like
Tennessee’s law, was a legislative response to court holdings that there was a right
to carry army pistols openly.271 The Texas Supreme Court allowed a law banning
the carrying of handguns, except while traveling or when a person had reasonable
grounds to fear attack.272
Further, state courts upheld prohibitions on various “abuses” of the right. The
Missouri Supreme Court approved restrictions on carrying firearms while
intoxicated.273 Other courts sustained prohibitions on carrying firearms concealed
with unlawful intent274 and pointing firearms at others,275 and one court held that
the right to bear arms did not extend to escaped convicts trying to avoid arrest.276
Moreover, courts held that complete bans on the possession of firearms in narrowly
defined areas, such as courthouses, polling places, and public gatherings, were
permissible regulations of the right to bear arms, not complete prohibitions on
exercising the right.277 By the early nineteen hundreds, a few outlier states still
afforded broad constitutional protection for individuals who carried pistols. In these
states, courts did not allow legislatures to generally prohibit or broadly restrict the
carrying of pistols; some decisions distinguished, for example, total prohibitions on
carrying a pistol within an entire city from narrowly tailored restrictions on
possessing weapons in courthouses, polling places, and public assemblies.278
Thus, to borrow Bruce Ackerman’s term, we see intergenerational synthesis.279
Courts held over some residue of a right to bear arms openly for private purposes.
But post–Civil War courts severely curtailed the right in response to popular
demand that handguns be further regulated. One need not analogize “guns as smut”
to defend a largely homebound Second Amendment;280 the civic republican reading
It must be confessed that this is a very inconvenient mode of carrying them
habitually, but the habitual carrying does not seem essential to “common
defense.” The inconvenience is a slight matter compared with the danger to the
whole community, which would result from the common practice of going
about with pistols in a belt, ready to be used on every outbreak of ungovernable
passion.
Haile v. State, 38 Ark. 564, 566 (Ark. 1882).
269. State v. Wilburn, 66 Tenn. 57 (1872).
270. Haile, 38 Ark. at 567.
271. See, e.g., Holland v. State, 33 Ark. 560 (1878); Wilson v. State, 33 Ark. 557 (1878);
Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455 (1876).
272. State v. Duke, 42 Tex. 455 (1874).
273. State v. Shelby, 2 S.W. 468 (Mo. 1886).
274. Wright v. Commonwealth, 77 Pa. 470 (1875).
275. Davenport v. State, 20 So. 971 (Ala. 1896).
276. Tolbert v. State, 14 So. 462 (Miss. 1893).
277. See, e.g., Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 472 (1874).
278. See, e.g., In re Brinkley, 70 P. 609 (Idaho 1902); State v. Kerner, 107 S.E. 222 (N.C.
1921) (striking down a licensing ordinance for unconcealed pistols); State v. Rosenthal, 55
A. 610 (Vt. 1903).
279. On intergenerational synthesis, see, for example, 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 90 (1991).
280. Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment,
109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278 (2009). Miller also provides historical reasons to support his
argument for limiting the Second Amendment to the home.
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accomplishes this. By 1900, the right to keep and bear arms was the right to keep
military-style weapons in the home and, in very limited cases, to bear them openly
in public. This required changing the structure of the right to bear arms by
emphasizing almost exclusively the right’s purpose as public defense against
oppression—and de-emphasizing individual self-defense.
III. UNITED STATES V. MILLER:
THE FAILURE TO REACH AN ACCEPTABLE SOCIAL COMPROMISE
United States v. Miller281 is one of the most maligned cases in constitutional
history. Justice Scalia, in Heller, writes that the case “did not even purport to be a
thorough examination of the Second Amendment.”282 Brian Frye, who compiled a
detailed history of the case, asserts that both individual and collective rights
theorists find Miller to be “an impenetrable mess.”283 Discussion of Miller often
involves mentioning Justice McReynolds’s personal or professional failings.284
In this Subpart, I make two claims. First, Miller is completely clear as to its
holding. Without retracing all of Frye’s extensive analysis, I will review the parts
of Miller that clearly establish that the Court was disposing of the case on grounds
considered “startling” today285: sawed-off shotguns are not “ordinary military
equipment.” Miller held, following Aymette, that only military arms were protected.
Miller explicitly refused to rule on the scope of the right.
Miller’s principal difficulty is not its opacity—the decision, fairly read, is
unambiguous; instead, Miller’s failing is that it entrenched a Second Amendment
right that could not adapt to changing popular constitutional norms concerning the
scope of the right to bear arms. Changing technology, along with the failure of the
militia system, created a situation where the contemporaneous population
considered military arms to be inappropriate for civilian possession. By recognizing
a right to have arms that the contemporaneous society was not prepared to accept,
the Supreme Court jammed the lower courts after Miller between recognizing a
collective right to keep and bear arms—which is essentially no right—and
recognizing a right considered so extreme that it was beyond the pale. Faced with
this choice, lower federal courts chose to adopt the collective rights view, thereby
removing themselves from deciding the scope of the Second Amendment. Thus,
Miller was not a failure because the case was opaque or wrongly decided; it was
neither. (Indeed, it was more originalist than Heller.) Miller failed because it left
courts unable to fashion a right to bear arms that comported with the popular
understanding of the right.

281. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
282. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 623 (2008) (citing Brian L. Frye, The
Peculiar Story of United States v. Miller, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 48, 65–68 (2008)).
283. Frye, supra note 282, at 49.
284. See id. at 70.
285. Heller, 554 U.S. at 624; see also Michael P. O’Shea, The Right to Defensive Arms
After District of Columbia v. Heller, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 349, 354–62 (2009) (suggesting
three possible interpretations of Miller and arguing that the best interpretation was that the
weapon at issue did not constitute “ordinary military equipment”).

1630

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 89:1587

A. United States v. Miller
In 1934, Congress adopted the second major gun control law in this country’s
history: the National Firearms Act.286 The Act was a response to gangster-era
violence, which Prohibition fueled.287 The Act attempted to ban gangster weapons,
most notably the Thompson submachine gun.288 Because Congress was concerned
that it did not have the constitutional power to ban machine gun possession—the
New Deal Commerce Clause jurisprudence had not yet been developed—Congress
imposed a tax modeled on the Harrison Narcotics Act.289 The law required an
expensive license to manufacture, import, or deal in certain highly destructive
weapons, most notably machine guns, short-barreled rifles and shotguns, silencers,
and concealable weapons other than pistols and revolvers (e.g., pen guns or other
gadget guns).290 Unlicensed individuals could only obtain these weapons if they
underwent a fingerprint-based criminal background check and paid a $200 transfer
or making tax—a tax steep enough to deter nearly all sales.291
Jack Miller and Frank Layton were arrested on April 18, 1938, for possessing a
sawed-off shotgun in interstate commerce in violation of the National Firearms
Act.292 The district court dismissed the indictment, holding, with no analysis, that
the Act violated the Second Amendment.293 The case came before the Supreme
Court on direct appeal by the government.
By the time of the appeal, the district courts had split on this issue. A district
court in Florida had upheld the Act, declaring, “The Constitution does not grant the
privilege to racketeers and desperadoes to carry weapons of the character dealt with
in the act. It refers to the militia, a protective force of government; to the collective
body and not individual rights.”294 Despite the “collective body and not individual

286. National Firearms Act, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934) (codified as amended at 26
U.S.C. §§ 5801–72 (2012)). The first major gun control law was the Miller Act, which
prohibited sending concealable firearms through the mail. See Act of Feb. 8, 1927, ch. 75, 44
Stat. 1059 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1715 (2012)). Frye gives a brief summary of
the history of the National Firearms Act. See Frye, supra note 282, at 60–63.
287. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-1780, at 1 (1934).
288. See David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Tenth Circuit: Three Decades of
(Mostly) Harmless Error, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 901, 911 (2009). On the Thompson
submachine gun and its relationship to state machine gun laws, see Marshall, supra note 56,
at 705 n.57.
289. Frye, supra note 282, at 61. Congress decided in 1986 that it did have the power to
ban machine guns. Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, sec. 102, § 922(o),
100 Stat. 449 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (2012).
290. National Firearms Act, 48 Stat. at 1236.
291. Frye, supra note 282, at 61. For the legal framework, see National Firearms Act, 48
Stat. at 1236–40. Congress subsequently reduced the transfer tax on certain concealable
weapons when they decided that some of the weapons had legitimate purposes. See Act of
June 16, 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-651, 52 Stat. 756 (establishing a $1 transfer tax); Act of June
1, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-478, 74 Stat. 149 (raising the tax to $5). The tax remains at $5 today.
26 U.S.C. § 5811(a) (2012).
292. Frye, supra note 282, at 48–49.
293. United States v. Miller, 26 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Ark. 1939).
294. United States v. Adams, 11 F. Supp. 216, 219 (D. Fla. 1935).
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rights” language, the opinion was not entirely clear about what it held. The district
court found that the Constitution did not apply to “weapons of the character dealt
with in the act” and then cited Workman and Hill, both of which held that
individuals have a right to possess ordinary military arms for public defense
purposes.295 It did not cite Blaksley, which held that the right only could be
exercised in state-organized military units.296 Thus, it is possible that the Florida
district court was recognizing a right to have military arms for public defense but
not for individual self-defense. Alternatively, the court may have been recognizing
a collective right to bear arms and just failed to cite the Kansas case.
The government’s brief in Miller contained two arguments.297 First, the
government argued that the right to bear arms “is not one which may be utilized for
private purposes but only one which exists where the arms are borne in the militia
or some other military organization provided for by law and intended for the
protection of the state.”298 The government’s brief cited and quoted heavily from
the three precedents that arguably gave a collective rights view: Justice Dickinson’s
seriatim opinion in Buzzard, the Kansas Supreme Court’s opinion in Blaksley, and
the Florida district court opinion in Adams.
Second, the government argued:
While some courts have said that the right to bear arms includes the
right of the individual to have them for the protection of his person and
property as well as the right of the people to bear them collectively, the
cases are unanimous in holding that the term “arms” as used in
constitutional provisions refers only to those weapons which are
ordinarily used for military or public defense purposes and does not
relate to those weapons which are commonly used by criminals.299
The “while some courts” language was an understatement. The government backed
its second argument with nearly twenty cases directly on point. As I have described
above, it was the overwhelmingly accepted view of the right to keep and bear arms
at the time—unlike the government’s collective rights argument, for which the
government could muster only two court opinions and one concurrence.
The Supreme Court clearly adopted the government’s second argument. The
Court held:
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or
use of a “shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length”
at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or
efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second
Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.
Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of

295. See supra notes 243–44 and accompanying text.
296. City of Salina v. Blaskley, 83 P. 619 (Kan. 1905).
297. Brief for the United States, supra note 32, at 18; see also United States v. Emerson,
270 F.3d 203, 222–23 (5th Cir. 2001) (recognizing the government’s alternative arguments);
Frye, supra note 282, at 66 (same).
298. Brief for the United States, supra note 32, at 15.
299. Id. at 18 (citations omitted).
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the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the
common defense. Aymette v. State of Tennessee, 2 Humph., Tenn.,
154, 158.300
Miller’s holding is as clear as day. Justice McReynolds was explicitly following
Aymette, which held that only those weapons that constitute the “ordinary military
equipment” are constitutionally protected.301 The sawed-off shotgun was never
ordinary military equipment. The whole essence of the sawed-off shotgun was that
it was an ordinary shotgun specially adapted for concealment and criminal
purposes, giving the user the destructive power of a shotgun and the portability of a
handgun. Miller was following Aymette and the post–Civil War progeny that it had
spawned: shortened weapons that have little or no military value—and were
specially adapted for concealment and criminal purposes—fell outside the scope of
“arms” protected by the Second Amendment. By the time Miller came down, there
were nearly 100 years of case law holding this, albeit usually applied to pocket
pistols rather than sawed-off shotguns.302

300. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).
301. Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 158 (1840); see also Hugo L. Black, The
Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 873 (1960) (“Although the Supreme Court has held
this Amendment to include only arms necessary to a well-regulated militia, as so construed,
its prohibition is absolute.”).
302. Nelson Lund reads the holding very literally. He observes:
Note that the Court does not hold that short-barreled shotguns are outside the
coverage of the Second Amendment. The Court says only that it has seen no
evidence that these weapons have certain militia-related characteristics—which
is no surprise given the procedural posture of the case—and that the Court
could not take judicial notice of certain facts about the military utility of these
weapons. After this statement, one would expect the case to be remanded to
give the defendants an opportunity to offer the kind of evidence called for in the
Court’s holding.
Nelson Lund, Heller and Second Amendment Precedent, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 335,
338 (2009) (noting also that the Court, in fact, remanded the case).
While Lund correctly observes the cautiousness of the holding, he reads the holding
out of its historical context. By the time Miller had been decided, a century of cases had held
that weapons specially adapted to concealment, and thus criminal purposes, were beyond the
scope of the right to bear arms. This is why the Supreme Court, at the end of its opinion,
notes that the district court’s opinion had no support in any state court decision. See Miller,
307 U.S. at 182 (“[No state court decision] seem[s] to afford any material support for the
challenged ruling of the court below.”). This would be an oddly sweeping condemnation if
the district court’s only failure had been to collect enough evidence of the military usefulness
of a sawed-off shotgun. Even if sawed-off shotguns had some military value, they have never
been ordinary military equipment—that is, commonly issued to soldiers, like muskets and
rifles have been. This fact—not the failure of Miller and Layton to argue in the Supreme
Court—is likely why the Court stated, “Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this
weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the
common defense.” Id. at 178. The remand that Lund cites was a remand for a criminal trial,
not a remand for them to present more evidence about the military value of a sawed-off
shotgun.
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Indeed, Aymette clearly found that individuals have an “unqualified right” to
keep military arms—and a more limited right to bear them—so that the people may
resist oppression. If the Court had intended to hold that the right was collective, it
would have cited Blaksley and argued that Miller and Layton were not active
members of the National Guard.
Just because the Court followed Aymette’s negative holding—that arms having
no military value are not constitutionally protected—does not mean that the Court
followed Aymette’s affirmative holding that all citizens have a right to keep military
arms.303 The Court, in fact, did not adopt Aymette’s affirmative holding. This
becomes clear when one analyzes the very end of the opinion—which, as far as I
can tell, only Brian Frye has done.304 The Court stated:
Most if not all of the States have adopted provisions touching the
right to keep and bear arms. Differences in the language employed in
these have naturally led to somewhat variant conclusions concerning
the scope of the right guaranteed. But none of them seem to afford any
material support for the challenged ruling of the court below.305
Frye concludes from this passage that “McReynolds assumed the scope of the
Second Amendment guarantee depends upon the relevant state constitution. Or at
the very least, the guarantees incorporated into the state constitutions illuminate the
scope of the right guaranteed by the Second Amendment.”306
Neither of Frye’s conclusions quite accurately explains the function of this
passage. In the next sentence, the Court stated, “In the margin some of the more
important opinions and comments by writers are cited.”307 Here, the Court cited a
number of state supreme court cases, including City of Salina v. Blaksley, the
Kansas case upholding only a collective right to bear arms in a state-organized
militia, as well as Aymette, Duke, Fife, Workman, and People v. Brown (a Michigan
case described below)—all of which upheld various species of an individual right.
In this final passage, the Supreme Court acknowledged the debate in state courts
over the subjects and content of the right to keep and bear arms.308 And it explicitly
stated that it did not need to resolve this dispute because, whatever the scope of the
right, it did not encompass possessing and carrying weapons specially adapted for
criminal purposes. In the footnote, the Court cited cases holding that there was a

303. For a contrary assumption, see Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second
Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 655 (1989) (classifying bazookas and rocket launchers as
possibly protected weapons).
304. Frye, supra note 282, at 76.
305. Miller, 307 U.S. at 182.
306. Frye, supra note 282, at 76.
307. Miller, 307 U.S. at 182.
308. These cases differed on whether they were applying the Second Amendment or state
analogues, but the analysis would be the same regardless. Most of these decisions had long
held that the federal and state constitutions were codifying the same preexisting right to bear
arms. See supra note 18. In some cases, the Second Amendment was applied directly.
Workman, for example, assumed the Second Amendment directly applied to the states. State
v. Workman, 14 S.E. 9, 11 (W. Va. 1891). West Virginia did not adopt a state analogue to
the Second Amendment until 1986. See Volokh, supra note 99, at 204.
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private right to bear arms for self-defense (e.g., Brown and Duke), an individual
right to bear arms only for public defense against oppression (e.g., Aymette,
Workman, and Fife), and a collective right to bear arms only in a state-organized
militia (Blaksley).309 No line of cases supported sawed-off shotguns as protected
weapons. That is likely why the Court’s opinion was unanimous, in an otherwise
bitterly divided Court.310
B. Miller and the Contemporaneous Understanding of the Right:
The Failure to Incorporate the Popular Understanding of the Right to Bear Arms
Miller’s drawback was not its holding or rationale. Excluding weapons with
little or no military value that were adapted for criminal purposes comported with
Aymette and nearly all of the case law from the post–Civil War era.311 Limiting the
Second Amendment’s protection to the ordinary personal arms of civilized warfare
would still guarantee that the people could resist oppression—the original purpose
of the right to bear arms.
Miller failed as a constitutional decision because it entrenched an originalist
version of the right to keep and bear arms that did not comport with the
contemporaneous understanding of the right in 1939. The failure of Miller was in
its timing.
By 1939, the militia system had disintegrated. Indeed, the system largely died
out following the War of 1812.312 Justice Story noticed the system was failing in
the antebellum period.313 The Tennessee Supreme Court in Andrews—an 1871
case—noted that the militia system had “passed away in almost every State of the
Union, and only remains to us as a memory of the past, probably never to be
revived.”314 The Dick Act, passed in 1903, divided the militia into an organized and
reserve component and eliminated the requirement that all white, male citizens
have firearms.315 All able-bodied men between eighteen and forty-five were (and
currently are316) part of the militia and subject to militia duty. As a practical matter,
however, no president or governor will call forth a member of the “reserve” or
“unorganized” militia. And by 1939, the United States had a sufficiently stable
political system that citizens did not feel a need to be armed to resist public
oppression. As a result, citizens had no ordinary use for militia-type weapons.

309. Miller, 307 U.S. at 182 n.3.
310. Given that the collective rights view was in the distinct minority among courts, it
would have been shocking if the Supreme Court reached unanimity—even without a
concurrence—on whether the right was individual or collective.
311. See supra Part II.
312. See supra note 197.
313. STORY, supra note 43, § 1890, at 746–47.
314. Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165, 184 (1871).
315. Act of Jan. 21, 1903 (Dick Act), ch. 196, 32 Stat. 775. The requirement to have arms
only applied to whites because Congress never updated the Militia Act of 1792 after the
Civil War. See Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271.
316. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 311–312, 331–335 (2012); Perpich v. Dep’t of Def., 496 U.S. 334,
352 n.25 (1990). The current minimum age of militia service is seventeen. 10 U.S.C. § 311.
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In the nineteenth century, courts could use the “military arms” formulation
because the weapons associated with crimes and duels—Bowie knives and small
handguns—were not sufficiently powerful to have military value. Courts could
vindicate the full value of the right to bear arms to resist public oppression (or to
use military arms for self-defense), while allowing states to ban weapons that had a
high propensity to be used in criminal wrongdoing.
This situation changed in the twentieth century: the Thompson submachine gun
became associated with the “public enemy,” while the military was also
transitioning to automatic weapons.317 In 1936, the military adopted the
semiautomatic M1 rifle, which would be the last standard-issue army rifle lawful
for general civilian possession.318 The advent of the machine gun and the
submachine gun clearly foreshadowed that the military would issue soldiers
automatic weapons as common military equipment. When the military adopted the
automatic M14 in 1957, for the first time in American history the soldier’s
“ordinary military equipment” was considered too dangerous for civilians generally
to possess.319 Thus, in the nineteenth century, “war arms” and arms appropriate for
“manly self-defense” were one and the same and were distinct from weapons
having criminal application; in the twentieth century, “war arms” and “gangster
weapons” were automatic weapons, whereas civilian guns for self-defense, hunting,
or target shooting were not.
Making the timing worse for the Supreme Court in Miller, only a few state court
cases recognized the problem. As early as 1921, the North Carolina Supreme Court
noted that modern military technology had diminished the importance of personal
small arms, especially the pistol, in warfare.320 The court singled out poison gas,
airplanes with bombs, and submarines as examples of weapons too powerful for
general civilian possession. At the other end of the spectrum, it reaffirmed
traditional prohibitions against certain knives carried as concealed weapons and
having no military value. The court determined that the proper test was weapons

317. See supra note 288. A brief note on the terminology in this paragraph:
semiautomatic firearms fire only one round each time the trigger is pulled, while fully
automatic firearms continue to fire until the trigger is released. (Both types of guns are
“automatic” in the sense that the gun automatically ejects the spent shell and reloads a new
round in the chamber without the need for the shooter manually to reload.) For legal
purposes, the term “machinegun” includes any firearm with the capability to shoot more than
one round with a single pull of the trigger. See 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) (2012).
318. By 1936, the military had a variety of fully automatic firearms in its arsenal.
Although these weapons were military equipment, they were not “ordinary military
equipment” because they were not issued to most infantry soldiers as part of their general
equipment. On the meaning of ordinary military equipment, see infra text accompanying
notes 338–43.
319. For a brief description of the U.S. Army’s move to automatic weapons, see EDWARD
CLINTON EZELL, SMALL ARMS OF THE WORLD 24–26 (12th ed. 1983). Although not generally
illegal for civilians to possess under federal law until 1986, the M14 was a “machinegun”
subject to the strictures of the National Firearms Act. See 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) (2012). Many
state laws did ban machine gun possession. In contrast, the M1 rifle was only semiautomatic.
EZELL, supra, at 16. The M1 rifle would not have fallen within any state or federal
prohibitions then existing.
320. State v. Kerner, 107 S.E. 222, 224 (N.C. 1921).
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“in common use, and borne by the people as such when this provision was
adopted”—including “rifles, muskets, shotguns, swords, and pistols”—even if such
weapons presently lacked significant military value.321
The Michigan Supreme Court took a different approach to refashioning the right
to bear arms around contemporaneous sentiments. In People v. Brown,322 the
Michigan Supreme Court changed the scope of the “arms” that were
constitutionally protected to those arms useful for individual self-defense, rather
than arms useful for militia service. The court recognized that the militia was
“legally existent” but “practically extinct”—and, in any event, armed by the
state.323 The court asserted that “[s]ome arms”—almost certainly implying machine
guns—“although they have a valid use for the protection of the state by organized
and instructed soldiery in times of war or riot, are too dangerous to be kept in a
settled community by individuals, and, in times of peace, find their use by bands of
criminals and have legitimate employment only by guards and police.”324 As a
result, the court held that the Michigan Constitution protected the “possession of
those arms which, by the common opinion and usage of law-abiding people, are
proper and legitimate to be kept upon private premises for the protection of person
and property.”325 Although the Supreme Court cited People v. Brown in the Miller
footnote, it did not address Brown’s critique of the nineteenth-century definition of
“arms.” This was a fairly new problem, and the Supreme Court did not have the
benefit of many new state court cases reformulating the right. Instead, the Court
accepted the almost-unanimous view of nineteenth-century cases that the
Constitution protects, at a minimum, common military arms.
C. Miller and the Courts of Appeals:
The Myth of Miller as Accepting a Collective Right
Because Miller used the nineteenth-century definition of “arms”—that the only
arms that were protected were militia arms—the courts of appeals became unable to
fashion the right to keep and bear arms around the contemporaneous understanding
of the right. No court wanted to entrench a right that seemed too
countermajoritarian, that is, too extreme by contemporaneous standards. For the
most part, the courts of appeals adopted the collective rights view—not because
they necessarily thought it correct—but because they wanted to remove themselves
from adjudicating Second Amendment questions. Given a choice between
legitimizing the civilian possession of war arms and withdrawing from deciding
Second Amendment claims, the courts of appeals selected to withdraw. Lower
federal courts largely avoided defining the content of the Second Amendment right
until Heller restored their authority to shape the right around contemporaneous
standards of reasonableness.
The courts of appeals noticed the problem with Miller immediately. In 1942, the
First Circuit opined that Miller’s “ordinary military equipment test” for “arms” was

321.
322.
323.
324.
325.

Id. at 224, 225.
235 N.W. 245 (Mich. 1931).
Id. at 246.
Id.
Id. at 247.
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not meant to be a general rule applicable to Second Amendment cases. As a general
rule, the “ordinary military equipment” test:
would seem to be already outdated, in spite of the fact that it was
formulated only three and a half years ago, because of the well known
fact that in the so called ‘Commando Units’ some sort of military use
seems to have been found for almost any modern lethal weapon.326
The court did not want to be left in the absurd situation of holding that Congress
could only “regulate the possession or use of weapons such as a flintlock musket or
a matchlock harquebus,” while having no authority over machine guns and
antiaircraft weapons—weapons private persons would lack “any legitimate reason
for having.”327 The court held that the Second Amendment did not apply in the case
because the defendant was “on a frolic of his own and without any thought or
intention of contributing to the efficiency of the well regulated militia.”328
The Sixth Circuit’s 1976 opinion in United States v. Warin329 also noticed the
problem—though this time the court faced a defendant with a more sophisticated
challenge. Francis Warin was charged with the possession of an unregistered
machine gun, and as an able-bodied adult male, he was a member of the militia of
the United States and the militia of Ohio.330
The Sixth Circuit agreed with Cases that Miller did not intend to lay down a
general rule. (Of course this was wrong: Miller did lay down a general rule—the
nineteenth-century rule.) But from the Sixth Circuit’s perspective, if the “ordinary
military equipment” test was out of date by Cases, the rule was positively nuts in a
time of nuclear weapons.331 The Sixth Circuit had developed a new rule: the right
to bear arms “applies only to the right of the State to maintain a militia and not to
the individual’s right to bear arms.”332 Membership in the unorganized militia did
not suffice; Warin would have to show that the gun was connected to the organized
militia333—what the Framers would have called the “select militia.” But in case this
holding was erroneous, the Sixth Circuit alternatively held that the machine gun
law was a reasonable regulation of the right to bear arms, which was not unlimited
at common law.334
Both Cases and Warin became extremely influential as other federal courts cited
them for the authority that individuals could not exercise the right to bear arms
unless their particular conduct—not the particular weapon—would contribute to a
well-regulated militia. These courts did not conduct significant further historical
analysis of the scope of the right.335 They simply paired citations to Miller with

326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.

Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 922 (1st Cir. 1942).
Id.
Id. at 923.
530 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 104–05.
Id. at 106.
Id. (quoting Stevens v. United States, 440 F.3d 144, 149 (6th Cir. 1971)).
Id. at 106-07; see also United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1977).
Warin, 530 F.2d at 107.
See, e.g., Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 711 (7th Cir. 1999);
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citations to other courts of appeals cases holding that the person’s possession of the
weapon had to relate to current organized militia service. These cases, thus, twisted
Miller’s holding—that the firearm has to relate to the militia. To provide extra
support for this bait and switch, these cases quoted the background principle stated
in Miller that the Second Amendment must be “interpreted and applied with [the
purpose of assuring the militia’s effectiveness].”336 A few cases, though, engaged in
some perfunctory historical analysis to justify why the right to bear arms only
belonged to organized militia.337
To be fair to Justice McReynolds, Cases, Warin, and their progeny created a
straw-man argument. One can view the phrase “ordinary military equipment” in
two ways. First, if the weapon is ordinarily somewhere within the military arsenal,
then it is protected. This is the reading offered by Cases and Warin when they
object that the contemporary military has a vast array of weapons. Cases worried
that “commando units” could make use of virtually anything, and Warin stated that
this was more ridiculous in the nuclear age. Professor Sanford Levinson made a
similar claim in his groundbreaking article, The Embarrassing Second
Amendment.338
Neither Miller nor Aymette took this extraordinarily broad view of “ordinary
military equipment.” Almost no nineteenth-century case extended the phrase
beyond those weapons ordinarily issued to individual soldiers as part of their
equipment.339 Courts routinely provided examples, such as rifles, muskets, and
army pistols. They never said that Gatling guns or heavy machine guns—which
Hiram Maxim first invented in 1884340—were constitutionally protected. If one
wanted further guidance on the phrase “ordinary military equipment,” he could
look to the constitutional purposes of the militia and ask what weapons soldiers are
ordinarily issued when enforcing the laws, suppressing insurrections, and repelling
invasions.341 Even today, soldiers typically carry weapons like the M16 rifle, the
M4 carbine, and the M9 pistol.342 Although submachine guns, machine guns, and
bombs have their places somewhere in the military arsenal, they are not the
Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98, 102 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016,
1019–20 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Cases and Warin); Cody v. United States, 460 F.2d 34, 36–
37 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Synnes, 438 F.2d 764, 772 (8th Cir. 1971) (citing
Cases). A few cases simply cited Miller for the proposition that the right to bear arms only
belonged to organized militiamen—as though Miller stood for the same proposition as City
of Salina v. Blaksley, 83 P. 619 (Kan. 1905). See, e.g., Oakes, 564 F.2d 384; United States v.
Decker, 446 F.2d 164, 166–67 (8th Cir. 1971); Stevens, 440 F.2d at 149.
336. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).
337. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Tot, 131 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1942). Tot also provided an alternative holding that the right to
bear arms was not absolute. The Ninth Circuit engaged in the best historical analysis of a
collective rights court, as an effort to rebut the Fifth Circuit’s similarly scholarly analysis in
Emerson. See Silveria v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2002).
338. See supra note 303.
339. See supra Part II.
340. See JOHN ELLIS, THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE MACHINE GUN 33–36 (1975).
341. Cf. Kates, supra note 30, at 259 (offering a different narrowing test).
342. See PortfolioFY2013, ARMY.MIL (April 2013), http://www.army.mil/factfiles
/equipment/individual/index.html. Some of the heavier weapons listed (e.g., machine guns)
are crew serviced—not ordinary individual—weapons.
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ordinary military equipment—commonly issued to each individual soldier to
possess and carry, in the same way that the automatic rifle or pistol is. A fortiori, no
military in the world ordinarily issues its soldiers nuclear bombs. Our paradigm
mental image of the militiaman is the citizen with his musket, not a citizen with a
private battleship or cannon.
But the courts of appeals were not trying to engage in a careful reading of Miller
or of the history of the Second Amendment. They were trying to extricate
themselves from deciding Second Amendment claims. Even if the Second
Amendment protected ordinary army rifles, by the time Second Amendment cases
were largely being heard—after the Gun Control Act of 1968—army rifles
consisted of weapons like the M16 assault rifle, which is (legally speaking) a
“machinegun” under the National Firearms Act.343 Allowing the general civilian
population to have free access to such weapons would not have comported with
modern notions of a reasonable right to bear arms under contemporaneous
standards.
The collective rights view of the Second Amendment removed the federal courts
from this quagmire. In all of the law review pages discussing the individual versus
collective right to bear arms, to my knowledge, no one has fleshed out how a
person could ever successfully challenge a law as violating a “collective right” to
bear arms. I suspect that this is because such a claim is impossible. Given the
Supreme Court precedent on the Militia Clauses, the rub of the collective rights
view is that courts can never hold that a law violates the Second Amendment.
Although there are a few different versions of the collective right,344 generally
one must assert that he is a member of a well-regulated state militia. But I am not
sure how one proves that he is in a “well-regulated militia.” The training of the
militia is a political question, not subject to judicial scrutiny.345 And yet, when
Warin (and many other cases) denies that technical militia membership suffices—a
person must be in a “well-regulated militia”—this assumes that the court has some
background notion of how much training and organization a militia must have
before the court can take judicial notice of the fact that it is “well-regulated.”
“Technical” militia members (i.e., members of the unorganized militia), like their
organized counterparts, are subject to militia duty under the Constitution and
federal law.346 The fact that they are not subject to periodic training is a legislative
choice. But suppose that the mass of people were assembled once a year—as
Hamilton suggested in Federalist Number 29—would this make them
“well-regulated”?347 If not, how much training is required, and how does a court
decide this? Deciding whether a militia is “well-regulated” presupposes the ability

343. 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) (2012).
344. See generally United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 218–20 (5th Cir. 2001)
(explaining the different “models” and collecting scholarship).
345. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) (“[I]t is difficult to conceive of an area of
governmental activity in which the courts have less competence.”).
346. 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–335 (2012).
347. THE FEDERALIST NO. 29, at 184 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed. 1961)
(“Little more can reasonably be aimed at with respect to the people at large than to have
them properly armed and equipped; and in order to see that this be not neglected, it will be
necessary to assemble them once or twice in the course of a year.”).
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of the courts to evaluate the amount of training and organization that the militia
has—an evaluation that Gilligan v. Morgan declares the judiciary incompetent to
undertake.
And to the extent that the Second Amendment only applies to the organized
militia, it is useless. No governmental body is going to organize and maintain a
body of troops—especially to the degree that they are “well-regulated”—and then
refuse to arm them.348 Instead, Congress simply will not enroll them in an
organized militia.349
With respect to individuals in an organized militia, even if the government
armed them inappropriately, no court would dare interfere.350 This would require a
court to assess what weapons a militiaman ought to be armed with, and then pass
judgment on whether Congress or the states handled the task appropriately.
Gilligan clearly makes this improper for courts to do. In fact, today’s National
Guard members are prohibited by orders from possessing private firearms in the
performance of their duties.351 I cannot imagine a court enjoining the practice and
requiring state and federal governments to allow Guardsmen to bring their
personally owned weapons to war.
Nor as a “right of the state to arm the militia” does the collective rights view
accomplish anything. A state does not have a right to have its own military force. In
the Selective Draft Law Cases,352 the Supreme Court held that the power to raise
and support armies was not limited by the Militia Clauses. Congress could, if it
wanted, draft every able-bodied citizen into military service, leaving the states with
no one in the militia.353 No federal court has ever held that the states can override
federal military policy on the militia.354 At most, by the end of the twentieth
century, the right to bear arms stood for the proposition that the states had
concurrent power to arm citizens in a state-organized part-time fighting force,355
provided that (1) Congress did not wish to conscript the people in those state forces
into federal military service and (2) the state forces were not organized contrary to

348. Moreover, this presupposes the conceptual possibility that one could be in a
“well-regulated militia” while that militia lacked arms. But a militia without arms almost
certainly would not be “well-regulated” in the Framers’ use of that phrase.
349. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 600 (2008) (noting that Congress
has plenary power over how to enroll in the militia).
350. Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 10.
351. U.S. ARMY MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS–IRAQ, GENERAL ORDER NUMBER 1 (GO-1),
PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES FOR U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THE
MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS–IRAQ (MNC–I) OR PRESENT WITHIN THE MNC–I AREA OF
RESPONSIBILITY (AOR) 2 (2009), available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/go1.pdf (prohibiting private firearms in Iraq). Similar orders prohibit National Guardsmen from
carrying private firearms at other times and locations.
352. Arver v. United States (Selective Draft Law Cases), 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
353. Id. at 382–83; see also J. Norman Heath, Exposing the Second Amendment: Federal
Preemption of State Militia Legislation, 79 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 39 (2001).
354. See Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366; see also Perpich v. Dep’t of Def., 496
U.S. 334 (1990).
355. The force could not be full-time since this would violate the constitutional
prohibition on keeping “troops” in time of peace. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3; 32
U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012).
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otherwise-valid federal legislation on the military or militia. A subservient
concurrent power hardly qualifies as a “right.” As the Eighth Circuit candidly
observed in 1992, “Since the Miller decision, no federal court has found any
individual’s possession of a military weapon to be ‘reasonably related to a well
regulated militia.’”356
The exploding popularity of a vacuous “collective” right to bear arms directly
descends from Miller’s holding that only military weapons have constitutional
protection. Before Miller, only two courts and possibly one concurring opinion had
ever adopted the collective rights view.357 The remaining courts tailored the right to
bear arms to be compatible with prevailing social norms on the place that weapons
have in society. Miller left the federal courts unable to do this, so the lower federal
courts extricated themselves from deciding Second Amendment cases. Contrary to
what Justice Stevens stated in his Heller dissent,358 hundreds of judges were not
relying on the holding in Miller; they were avoiding it.
IV. HELLER: REFRAMING THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS FOR A NEW GENERATION
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller was not a
“Triumph of Originalism.”359 There is almost nothing originalist about the
opinion’s pronouncement on the content of the right to bear arms. The Court’s
originalism was limited to discerning the proper subjects of the right—that
individuals, not in active military service, have a right to bear arms. The Court held
that the right is not limited to being a member of a state-sponsored, highly
organized militia—which, as I described above, is really no right at all.
Instead, Heller has a direct continuity with the nineteenth-century right to bear
arms. In the eighteen hundreds, two generations of courts refashioned the scope of
the right to comport with popular constitutional sentiment. The right—and the
restrictions on the right—reflected contemporaneous notions of reasonableness. As
crime with knives and concealed weapons became ubiquitous, antebellum courts
allowed legislatures to pass laws governing concealed weapons, while still
protecting the right to carry arms for private self-defense. The three courts that
failed to do this—two courts that found an absolute right, and one court that found
no private right at all—had their doctrines overturned at the next available
opportunity.360 In the post–Civil War period, courts allowed greater legislative

356. United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1020 (8th Cir. 1992).
357. See United States v. Adams, 11 F. Supp. 216 (S.D. Fla. 1935); State v. Buzzard, 4
Ark. 18, 33 (1842) (opinion of Dickinson, J.); City of Salina v. Blaksley, 83 P. 619 (Kan.
1905).
358. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 638 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
359. Siegel, supra note 5, at 191 & n.5 (collecting sources celebrating Heller as an
originalist opinion).
360. The three courts were the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12
Ky. (2 Litt.) 90 (1822), which held the right to be absolute; the Tennessee Supreme Court in
Simpson v. State, 13 Tenn. (5 Yer.) 356 (1833), which although not holding that the right
was absolute, had dicta to that effect; and State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1842), in which two of
the three judges held that the right did not protect arms for private defense. The Kentucky
Constitutional Convention in 1849 overturned Bliss by amending the right-to-bear-arms

1642

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 89:1587

latitude to deal with the problems inflicted with handguns. Post–Civil War courts
recognized the right to bear arms as consisting primarily in the right to have arms
for defense against public oppression, although they often held that individuals
could carry them for private self-defense, too. But private self-defense, especially
with a handgun, was in the outer perimeter of the right to keep and bear arms: by
1900, few types of pistols had constitutional protection, and courts were approving
sharper limits on carrying weapons in public, even if not concealed.
Heller likewise refashioned the right for a new generation. With military
weapons considered inappropriate for civilian use, Heller “clarified” the Miller
common-use test. Military rifles were declared beyond the constitutional right. The
Court, in dicta, approved limits on felons having guns, despite the restriction
having no historical basis. Heller held that the core of the right to keep and bear
arms consisted of possessing handguns in the home for personal self-defense—
even though, in the nineteenth century, it was arguable whether handguns had
constitutional protection and whether private self-defense fell within the scope of
the right to bear arms. Heller did not rule on whether requiring a license is
appropriate, even though antebellum courts only allowed licensing of free blacks,
who were not full citizens. In short, Heller’s right to keep and bear arms is the
Second Amendment right supported by a majority of Americans today. This right,
then, was enforced against jurisdictions that adopted laws deemed unreasonable by
contemporary standards.
Dick Heller was a special policeman living in the District of Columbia. He was
too old to even be a member of the unorganized militia.361 Heller attempted to
register a .22 caliber revolver, a target-shooting gun that had no military value
whatsoever and had little value for self-defense.362 He attempted to register the
provision to exclude concealed weapons. See KY. CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, § 25 (1850)
(“That the right of citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and the State shall not be
questioned; but the General Assembly may pass laws to prevent persons from carrying
concealed arms.”). Aymette repudiated Simpson. Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154,
161 (1840). Buzzard’s overruling was a bit more complicated. The Arkansas Supreme Court
nominally reaffirmed Buzzard in Carroll v. State, 28 Ark. 99, 101 (1872), but reinterpreted
the decision to be about the authority of the legislature to regulate the “constitutional right to
bear arms in defense of person and property.” Four years later, Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455,
458–61 (1876), explicitly held that citizens had a limited right to bear arms openly for
private defense.
One might object that Aymette did not recognize a right of bearing arms for private
self-defense, and yet, was not overturned. Although Aymette’s dicta rejects the individual
self-defense rationale, Aymette, 21 Tenn. at 157, the court nevertheless reaffirmed a general
right to carry arms openly, id. at 160–61. Practically, therefore, individuals still had a right to
bear arms for individual self-defense.
361. Heller was sixty-six years old when the case was being decided and too old to be a
part of the District militia. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 707 (2008) (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
362. See Paul Duggan, Having Toppled D.C. Ban, Man Registers Revolver, WASH. POST,
July
19,
2008,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/18
/AR2008071801212.html. The Internet site has a picture of the revolver. According to the
article, Heller also apparently had a .45 Colt M1911 pistol, which was the military’s standard
sidearm from 1911 until 1986. See Scott Engen, The History of the 1911 Pistol,
BROWNING.COM (Jan. 24, 2011), http://www.browning.com/library/infonews/detail.asp
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revolver, but the police denied his application because of a 1976 District of
Columbia ordinance prohibiting new registrations of pistols.363 Moreover, D.C. law
prohibited carrying a pistol in the home without a license to carry, which was
almost never issued.364
The District defended the law on three grounds. First, the District alleged that
the right to bear arms was a collective right. Second, the District argued that since
the law only applied to the District, the handgun ban had no relevance to protecting
state governments from federal interference. Third, even if it were an individual
right, complete bans on some kinds of protected arms were acceptable, provided
other weapons were available.365 The District did allow residents to register some
rifles and shotguns, provided that the weapons were not semiautomatic with a
detachable magazine.366 In a poor strategic choice, the District did not argue that,
regardless of the scope of the Second Amendment, the right did not protect
handguns—or at least Heller’s .22 caliber revolver. Given the “originalist”
character of the Court, the District could have marshaled significant nineteenthcentury precedent on this point.
The Court held that the Second Amendment protects “an individual right to
possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm for
traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home.”367 Its
historical support for a right of private self-defense required some creative liberties.
After giving a fairly lengthy—and accurate—description of the right’s genesis in
the English Civil War and Glorious Revolution, Justice Scalia then cited
Blackstone for the proposition that the right to have arms protects “the natural right
of resistance and self-preservation” and “the right of having and using arms for
self-preservation and defence.”368
Justice Scalia’s quotation of Blackstone is selective—and misleading. The full
quotation reads that the right to have arms “is indeed a public allowance, under due
restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and self-preservation, when the
sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of
oppression.”369 Blackstone is talking about self-defense against the Crown—not
?id=301. But this was not part of the original Heller case because registering that would have
required challenging D.C.’s machine gun ban, which also included virtually all modern
semiautomatic weapons in its definition. See D.C. CODE § 22-4501(c) (2001) (including any
weapon that could be readily restored to fire more than twelve times semiautomatically
without reloading as a “machine gun”).
363. See D.C. CODE § 7-2502.02(a)(4) (2001), amended by Firearms Control Amendment
Act of 2008, L. No. L17-0372, § 3(a)(10). Before this amendment, the District had also
passed temporary legislation changing the definition.
364. D.C. CODE § 22-4506 (2001), repealed by Inoperable Pistol Amendment Act of
2008, L. No. 17-0388, § 2(f); see Bsharah v. United States, 646 A.2d 993, 996 n.12 (D.C.
1994) (“It is common knowledge . . . that with very rare exceptions licenses to carry pistols
have not been issued in the District of Columbia for many years and are virtually
unobtainable.”).
365. Brief for Petitioners at 11, 35, 41, Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (No. 07-290).
366. Such weapons would violate the machine gun ban. See supra note 362.
367. Heller, 554 U.S. at 570; see also McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3044
(2010) (describing Heller’s holding).
368. Heller, 554 U.S. at 594 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *144).
369. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *144 (emphasis added).
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self-defense against a burglar. And lest there be any doubt about the meaning, it
becomes clear in Book Two of the Commentaries. Blackstone lists, among the
various reasons for the game laws, “prevention of popular insurrections and
resistance to the government, by disarming the bulk of the people: which last is a
reason oftener meant, than avowed, by the makers of forest or game laws.”370
Blackstone never mentions any objection to not having arms available for personal
self-defense against criminals. The concern is with the “bulk of the people” having
arms so they can resist illegal executive power. And this view of the right comports
with Madison’s exposition of the value of citizens having arms in Federalist
Number 46.371
But Justice Scalia is not aiming for historical accuracy on the scope of the right.
He is changing the scope of the right, to make the right to bear arms primarily
about individual self-defense with handguns. At the time Heller came down, 73%
of Americans believed that they had a right to own a gun, versus 20% who thought
it belonged only to the militia.372 Another poll in 2009 by CNN asked:
Which of the following comes closer to your interpretation of the
Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution? In addition to addressing
the need for citizen-militias, it was intended to give individual
Americans the right to keep and bear arms for their own defense. It was
only intended to preserve the existence of citizen-militias, and does not
give individual Americans the right to keep and bear arms for their own
defense.373
Americans answered the question by selecting “self-defense” by a 77%–21%
majority. And Americans are strongly against banning handguns, by a nearly
two-to-one margin.374 Interestingly, the population was more sympathetic to a
handgun ban in the 1970s and 1980s, while the courts were adopting the collective
rights view of the Second Amendment—so much for the Court acting as a
countermajoritarian institution.375
Of course, although Americans do support the right to bear arms in principle,
they are split on whether Congress should adopt greater gun controls. In 2007,
two-thirds of Americans thought that handgun laws should be made stricter.376
About half of Americans in 2009 supported bans on so-called assault weapons,
which was down from 75% two decades earlier—but still much higher than the

370. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *412.
371. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
372. Joan Biskupic, Do You Have a Legal Right to Own a Gun?, USA TODAY, Feb. 27,
2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2008-02-26-guns-cover_N.htm.
373. CNN/Opinion Research Corp. Poll, May 14–17, 2009, available at
http://www.pollingreport.com/guns2.htm.
374. This and the following statistics come from a CBS News/New York Times Poll
Report. Guns and Violence, CBS News/N.Y. Times Poll (Apr. 23, 2007), available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/CBSNews_polls/aprbhandguns.pdf.
375. Jeffrey M. Jones, Record-Low 26% in U.S. Favor Handgun Ban, GALLUP (Oct. 26,
2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/150341/record-low-favor-handgun-ban.aspx (graphing
support over the last fifty years).
376. Guns and Violence, supra note 374, at 1.
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proportion of the population that supports banning handguns.377 Convicted felons
have the lowest popular support for their right to keep arms: a 2008 CNN poll
found that 88% of Americans think the law should ban felons and those with
mental illness from having guns.378 And Americans, even those in somewhat red
states, believe that some places are inappropriate for guns: a 2011 poll of registered
voters in Virginia, for example, found that voters overwhelmingly (75%–20%)
oppose guns on college campuses and oppose by a nearly two-thirds majority
allowing persons with permits to carry concealed firearms to bring their guns onto a
college campus.379
This modern view of the right to keep and bear arms is exactly the right we get
in Heller. The most important part of Heller is its dicta on permissible government
regulation of the right, which courts now use as precedent to decide Second
Amendment challenges. With no analysis whatsoever, the Court declared:
Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today
of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion
should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding
the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and
government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications
on the commercial sale of arms.380
Again without analysis, the Court reaffirmed these categories in McDonald v.
Chicago.381
The problem is that many of these “longstanding” laws have no historical
constitutional basis. Federal law banned felons from possessing guns in 1968; that
is not very “longstanding.”382 The closest nineteenth-century analogues I have
found are laws prohibiting prisoners and vagrants from having guns.383
This is not to say that the passage is completely inaccurate as a historical matter.
Laws prohibiting guns in “sensitive places,” for example, have a much more
longstanding history.384 As I explained above, the nineteenth-century courts upheld

377. Hart/McInturff Study #6098, NBC/Wall St. J. Survey, Oct. 22–25, 2009, at 23,
available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/wsjnbc-10272009.pdf. Due to
recent mass shootings, public opinion on this question may be in a state of flux.
378. CNN/Opinion Research Corp. Poll, June 4–5, 2008, available at
http://www.pollingreport.com/guns2.htm.
379. See Michael Sluss, Poll: Most in Virginia Oppose Guns on Campus, ROANOKE
TIMES (Dec. 23, 2011), http://ww2.roanoke.com/politics/wb/302726/ (reporting a Quinnipiac
University survey).
380. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008).
381. McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047 (2010) (“We repeat those assurances
here.”).
382. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213; see also Marshall, supra
note 56. A 1961 amendment to the Federal Firearms Act of 1938 barred all felons (instead of
merely individuals convicted of a violent felony) from receiving firearms in interstate
commerce. The law did not bar possession, however. Id. at 698 (citing An Act to Strengthen
the Federal Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 87-342, 75 Stat. 757 (1961)).
383. See supra note 54 and accompanying text; supra note 222 and accompanying text.
384. The Statute of Northampton, 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328) (Eng.), prohibited guns in
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prohibitions on carrying weapons into polling places, courthouses, and public
gatherings.385 The usual concept was that such laws were permissible regulations of
the right, provided they were not overbroad. The courts usually did not say that the
conduct fell completely outside the scope of the right, but rather that the
government could regulate a particular abuse of the right.
But the area where Heller completely divorces itself from history is its
treatment of which weapons are constitutionally protected. Justice Scalia finds it
startling to read Miller for the proposition that “ordinary military equipment” could
mean that “only those weapons useful in warfare are protected.”386 Of course, this
is exactly what Aymette, the authority cited in Miller, held: protected weapons were
individual weapons of “civilized warfare.”387 In its place, the Court replaces this
definition with the “common use” test: protected “arms” are those “typically
possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.”388 And why are handguns
within the scope of the right? Because, Justice Scalia tells us, handguns are “the
most preferred firearm in the nation to ‘keep’ and use for protection of one’s home
and family.”389 Justice Breyer criticizes the new definition as circular—which it
is—but then again, it is no more circular than “reasonable expectation of
privacy.”390
The move to the “common use” test was undoubtedly a change—but not an
unprecedented one. The Michigan Supreme Court in People v. Brown made a
similar change to the right to bear arms.391 And in State v. Duke, the Texas
Supreme Court protected both military weapons and those commonly possessed by
law-abiding citizens, lest citizens find their everyday weapons without
constitutional protection.392 Most importantly, this test solved Miller’s principal
drawback of approving weapons considered inappropriate for civilian possession.
Perhaps most extraordinary in formulating the new test is what happens to army
rifles. In the nineteenth-century cases, the army rifle was at the very core of
constitutional protection. Banning army rifles or muskets would have been to the
Second Amendment what banning a particular mainstream political opinion would
be to the First. Justice Scalia finds, in the common-law prohibition against carrying
dangerous or unusual weapons, authority for banning “M-16 rifles and the like”—
the core ordinary, individual weapon of today’s infantry soldier.393 As Reva Siegel
correctly argues:
In this remarkable passage, the majority imposes restrictions on the
kinds of weapons protected by the Second Amendment that the
courthouses, marketplaces, and similar gatherings.
385. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
386. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 624 (2008).
387. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
388. Heller, 554 U.S. at 625.
389. Id. at 628–29 (quoting Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 400 (D.C. Cir.
2007)); see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010) (collecting
quotations from Heller about the popularity of handguns for self-defense).
390. Heller, 554 U.S. at 721 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also O’Shea, supra note 285, at
384.
391. See supra note 323 and accompanying text.
392. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
393. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 (majority opinion).
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majority concedes would disable exercise of the right for the
amendment’s textually enunciated purposes. How could an originalist
interpretation of the Second Amendment exclude from its protection
the kinds of weapons necessary to resist tyranny—the republican
purpose the text of the Second Amendment discusses and, on the
majority’s own account, “the purpose for which the right was
codified”?394
Siegel’s criticism is exactly right as a matter of originalism. Although Justice
Scalia writes, “The traditional militia was formed from a pool of men bringing
arms ‘in common use at the time’ for lawful purposes like self-defense,”395 he has
no authority for this proposition—likely because Justice Scalia has it backward.
The tradition in England was that individuals would possess ordinary military
weapons. This tradition dated at least from the Assize of Arms in 1181.396 When
the Crown required people to have arms, the Assize of Arms selected weapons and
body armor that were in common military use—not weapons that individuals
happened to otherwise possess in their civilian lives for lawful purposes like selfdefense. In fact, individual self-defense against criminals was illegal in England at
the time.397 The Assize of Arms listed weapons like chainmail, a helmet, a sword,
and a shield—clearly military weapons, just like the muskets, pistols, and related
military equipment prescribed by the Militia Act of 1792.398 I doubt seriously that
twelfth-century Englishmen ordinarily kept chainmail, helmet, and a shield as part
of their individual self-defense weapons in case a burglar broke into their home.
The thought of someone trying to don all of this equipment in such an emergency is
kind of ridiculous. Nor do I know of any evidence that ordinary citizens walked
around in their helmets and chainmail in the usual course of their civilian lives. In
fact, the common-law prohibition against carrying dangerous or unusual weapons
may have originally punished exactly that: those who went out in public fully
armed with their militia weapons and body armor in circumstances likely to
provoke fear.
Justice Scalia’s attempt to trace modern restrictions on military weapons to the
common-law prohibition of going armed with dangerous or unusual weapons is
unavailing. Although the crime is said to be a common-law offense, the Statute of
Northampton implemented it and prescribed the punishment. That statute provided:
That no Man great nor small, of what Condition soever he be, except
the King’s Servants in his presence, and his Ministers in executing of
the King’s Precepts, or of their Office, and such as be in their Company
assisting them, and also [upon a Cry made for Arms to keep the Peace,
and the same in such places where such Acts happen,] be so hardy to
come before the King’s Justices, or other of the King’s Ministers doing

394. Siegel, supra note 5, at 200.
395. Heller, 554 U.S. at 624.
396. Assize of Arms, 27 Hen. 2 (1181) (Eng.).
397. 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 478 (2d ed., Cambridge Univ. Press reprint 1968)
(1895) (persons who killed in individual self-defense “deserve[d] but need[ed] a pardon”).
398. Assize of Arms §§ 1–2.
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their office, with force and arms, nor bring no force in affray of the
peace, nor to go nor ride armed by night nor by day, in Fairs, Markets,
nor in the presence of the Justices or other Ministers, nor in no part
elsewhere, upon pain to forfeit their Armour to the King, and their
Bodies to Prison at the King’s pleasure.399
Despite the seemingly broad textual prohibition on carrying arms everywhere,
courts construed the prohibition very narrowly—on the rare occasions that the
statute was enforced. The common-law prohibition applied to carrying weapons in
public. The Court of King’s Bench required that the carrier have the illegal purpose
of terrifying citizens.400 This was the construction given to it in the United States by
the North Carolina courts, the only courts that have seriously enforced the
prohibition.401 The antebellum North Carolina Supreme Court, in State v. Huntly,
stated that all guns are “dangerous or unusual weapons” for the purpose of this
prohibition.402 Although gun ownership was common among Americans (and
included guns of all kinds), the court argued that most individuals did not
frequently carry those weapons. The crime was committed by carrying deadly
weapons in public only if the person carrying the weapons had both the unlawful
purpose of terrorizing others and if he carried the weapons “in such manner as
naturally will terrify and alarm a peaceful people.”403
Other authorities claim that the prohibition extended, beyond those with a
specific intent to terrify, to those carrying weapons under circumstances that would
provoke fear in reasonable people.404 William Hawkins distinguished between
usual and unusual weapons. Because the public possession of common weapons
does not cause fear in reasonable people, people are free to carry them for
self-defense.405 In contrast, going armed with unusual weapons in ordinary
circumstances will provoke fear in reasonable people, so carrying them is generally
prohibited. This prohibition often included not just the carrying of certain weapons,
but also walking the streets in armor.406 Nevertheless, no one violated the common-

399. The Statute of Northampton, 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328) (Eng.) (brackets in original)
(footnote omitted).
400. Sir John Knight’s Case, (1686) 87 Eng. Rep. 75 (K.B.) 76; 3 Mod. 117, 118 (“[T]he
meaning of the statute of . . . was to punish people who go armed to terrify the King’s
subjects.”); R v. Sir John Knight, (1686) 90 Eng. Rep. 330 (K.B.) 330; Comb. 38, 39
(requiring evil intent); State v. Huntly, 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 418, 423 (1843) (requiring both a
purpose to “terrify and alarm” and carrying the weapons in public “in such manner as
naturally will terrify and alarm, a peaceful people”).
401. Tennessee declined early to recognize this common-law offense due to the right to
bear arms. Simpson v. State, 13 Tenn. (5 Yer.) 356 (1833). Most states have abolished
English common-law offenses.
402. Huntly, 25 N.C. at 422–23.
403. Id. at 423.
404. 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE P LEAS OF THE CROWN §§ 4–10, at 488–89
(8th ed. 1824); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *149.
405. 1 HAWKINS, supra note 404, § 9, at 489; see also R v. Sir John Knight, 90 Eng. Rep.
at 330 (recognizing “a general connivance to gentlemen to ride armed for their security”).
406. 20 Rich. II, c. 1 (1396) (Eng.) (enumerating “sallets,” “Skull[s] of Iron,” and other
armor); 1 HAWKINS, supra note 404, §§ 4–10, at 489; cf. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
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law prohibition by defending his home (or the home of another) against unlawful
violence or by defending the state against invaders and domestic disturbances.407 In
these circumstances, it is clear that the person carrying the weapons has no
intention to breach the peace.
Justice Scalia erred in using this common-law prohibition as a historical
precedent to justify a total ban on “M-16 rifles and the like.” Today, the M16 rifle
and its derivatives are at the very core of the contemporary soldier’s individual
arms. Without these, no militia could be “well-regulated.”
Justice Scalia might respond that England did occasionally ban specific weapons
completely. Two statutes of Richard II, which further implemented the Statute of
Northampton, did prohibit lancegays, a type of spear.408 Thus, there is some
historical precedent for banning weapons completely, whether carried in public or
not.
I doubt, however, that these statutes will support Justice Scalia’s argument. The
ban on lancegays was on a very specific type of weapon. The statute would be more
analogous to a Prohibition-era legislature simply banning the Thompson
submachine gun in light of the violence of organized crime. The ban on lancegays
in no way deprived people of military arms generally, as does a complete ban on all
military rifles.409
Moreover, this particular ban did precede the creation of the right to have arms
in the seventeenth century. By the time the right to have arms found its way into the
English Bill of Rights, this particular weapon was obsolete, and so it is not clear if
an analogous seventeenth-century ban would have been met with approval. Likely,
a narrow ban on a very particular kind of weapon creating large public externalities
would have been compatible with the right to have arms, whereas banning the
entire class of military arms for civilian possession would not.
By using the common-law rule to justify prohibitions against “M-16 rifles and
the like,” Justice Scalia completely inverted the Second Amendment from its
nineteenth-century understanding: army rifles to resist tyranny are out; handguns in
the home for private purposes are in. How could an originalist interpretation of the
Second Amendment exclude from its protection the kinds of weapons necessary to
resist tyranny? An originalist interpretation cannot. Justice Scalia is not engaged in
originalism; he is engaged in Ackermanian-style intergenerational synthesis.410
Heller could have taken a different approach to the “machine gun problem.”
Contemporaneous detractors of the nineteenth-century definition of “arms”
objected to the “ordinary military equipment” test on the grounds that it might
invalidate the general federal prohibition on “machineguns.”411 For them,
COMMENTARIES *149 (discussing the Laws of Solon, which made Athenians finable for
walking the street in armor).
407. 1 HAWKINS, supra note 404, §§ 8, 10, at 489.
408. 7 Rich. II, c. 13 (1383) (Eng.); 20 Rich. II, c. 1.
409. See, e.g., Benjamin v. Bailey, 662 A.2d 1226 (Conn. 1995) (“[A] statutory ban on
assault weapons, because it continues to permit access to a wide array of weapons, does not
infringe on the right to bear arms . . . .”); Volokh, supra note 97, at 1454–55 (analogizing
from First Amendment doctrine that looks to alternative channels of expression).
410. See 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 279, at 90. On Scalia’s opinion being an example of
living constitutionalism, see Siegel, supra note 5, at 192 & n.6.
411. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (2012) (generally prohibiting machineguns); O’Shea, supra
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recognizing a general right of individuals to have automatic weapons was a
reductio ad absurdum of recognizing an individual Second Amendment right to
have arms that were useful for contemporary militia service.
In response, the Court simply could have said that the ban on machine guns was
a regulation—not a prohibition—of a core component of the right to keep and bear
arms. Bans on handguns were impermissible because they eliminated “an entire
class of arms.”412 The machine gun ban does not do this. Handguns, rifles,
shotguns, and other firearms become, in legal terminology, “machineguns” when
they are capable of shooting multiple shots with a single function of the trigger.413
The machine gun ban did not ban an entire class of weapons: the handgun, rifle,
and shotgun are still lawful. The ban just narrowly restricts the mode in which these
particular guns fire, limiting them to one shot per pull of the trigger—just like
prohibiting guns in a courtroom narrowly restricts the right to bear arms in public.
But this approach, of course, would not have totally refashioned the right to bear
arms in the right’s contemporaneous popular image—as a right to have arms
primarily for personal self-defense—and that is what Justice Scalia was trying to
do.
CONCLUSION
When it comes to the right to keep and bear arms, courts have never been
originalists. Subsequent generations remake the right to fit the popular conception
of what the right ought to be. In the antebellum period, this meant expanding the
right to include private self-defense and the right to carry guns openly for personal
protection—while allowing state legislatures to enact concealed weapons laws in
an effort to prevent crime and dueling. After the Civil War, courts curtailed the
right to have guns in public; to justify this, they adopted a different theory of the
right to bear arms, one that recognized its civic republican character and diminished
the importance of individual self-defense. The courts thus altered their
understanding of the purpose of the right to justify altering the dimensions of the
right—dimensions that comported with the popular conceptions of the right’s scope
and their demand for legislative solutions for the criminal use of weapons. Courts
then applied the right against jurisdictions that adopted unusually severe laws for
that time period. The content of the “regulation/prohibition” distinction that
Winkler identifies is formed around contemporaneous notions of reasonableness.
Heller is not an originalist decision, and it should not purport to be. Heller
remade the Second Amendment around its current popular understanding. The rule
in Miller—while almost certainly historically accurate—failed to allow courts to
refashion the right in a manner palatable to the contemporaneous population. This
is why Miller failed. Likewise, the collective rights cases failed because few people
seriously understand the right to bear arms to protect nothing.
The future of Heller remains uncertain. But I can say, with a fair amount of
confidence, that how courts flesh out the right to bear arms tomorrow will strongly

note 285, at 361–62 (describing the potential invalidation of the machine gun ban as the
Government’s overwhelming concern in its Heller arguments).
412. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008) (quotation marks omitted).
413. See 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) (2012) (defining “machinegun”).
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resemble how the contemporaneous population understands the right—not what
James Madison thought when he drafted the provision in 1789.

